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Summary 
The general goal of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union is 
to create a social market economy, where free competition is crucial. The 
Competition rules, governing the actions of the parties on the Swedish and 
EU market, aim to prevent conduct that may restrict effective competition. 
From an economic point of view it is necessary to have the ability to 
influence the market in order to restrict effective competition. The 
condition, that a restriction of competition must have an appreciable effect 
is therefore at the centre of the question of market power. In this paper I 
discuss the necessary depth and sophistication of the market definition 
required to satisfy the appreciability requirement in relation to agreements 
that restrict competition by object. I also discuss what the relevant factors 
and thresholds are in the assessment such agreements. 
The definition of the relevant market has been considered a necessary 
precondition in order to establish whether an agreement appreciably restrict 
competition. Although, the EU courts have stated that the market must only 
be defined, where it would be impossible without such a definition to find 
that the prohibition has been infringed. The reasoning follows from case law 
stating that it is not necessary to analyse agreements in their economic and 
legal context once it has been established that they obviously restrict 
competition. The obviousness of the restriction may be inferred primarily 
from the nature of the agreement and from a summary assessment of the 
circumstances relevant in the case. Perhaps, guidance as to the obviousness 
of the restriction comes from asking whether it is clear that the market 
shares, without being precisely determined, far exceed 5 %. In addition to 
defining the market in order to satisfy the conditions in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and 
Art. 101(1) TFEU, it is necessary to define the market in sufficient detail to 
satisfy the essential requirement of legal certainty. 
The application of the appreciability requirement in cases where the 
agreement restrict competition by object is debated within the EU. 
However, it seems as though both Swedish and EU courts have settled that 
it is necessary to apply the condition in object as well as effect cases. The 
assessment of the appreciability condition is divided into a quantitative and 
a qualitative aspect. The quantitative analysis generally considers the 
position and importance of the parties and the structure on the market. There 
is no clear guidance as to the level of the market share threshold from either 
the EU guidelines or the Swedish and EU courts, in relation to object 
restrictions. The uncertainty regarding the appreciable effects of an 
agreement may, however, start to become evident where the market share of 
the undertakings moves below 5 %. The qualitative aspect considers 
whether the restriction in itself is insignificant. This analysis takes into 
account the nature of the agreement and whether an established restriction is 
limited by objectively ascertainable factors, such as national legislation. 
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Sammanfattning 
Den övergripande målsättningen med Fördraget om Europeiska Unionens 
Funktionssätt är att skapa en social marknadsekonomi där fri konkurrens 
spelar en avgörande roll. Konkurrensreglerna som styr företagens handlande 
på marknaden i Sverige och inom EU strävar efter att förhindra handlande 
som kan begränsa effektiv konkurrens. Ur ekonomisk synvinkel är det 
nödvändigt att möjligheten finns att marknaden kan påverkas för att 
begränsa effektiv konkurrens. Kravet på att en konkurrensbegränsning ska 
ha märkbara effekter ligger därför nära kärnan av frågan om 
marknadsinflytande. Jag diskuterar i denna uppsats hur djupgående och 
sofistikerad en marknadsdefinition måste vara för att kravet på märkbar 
effekt ska anses uppfyllt i förhållande till syftesöverträdelser. Jag diskuterar 
även vilka faktorer och tröskelvärden som är relevanta för bedömningen av 
syftesöverträdelser. 
Definitionen av den relevanta marknaden har ansetts vara en nödvändig 
förutsättning för att fastställa att ett avtal märkbart begränsar konkurrensen. 
EU domstolarna har dock konstaterat att det enbart är nödvändigt att 
definiera marknaden om det utan en sådan definition skulle vara omöjligt att 
fastställa att en överträdelse har skett av förbudet. Resonemanget följer av 
tidigare rättspraxis som konstaterat att det inte är nödvändigt att se till den 
ekonomiska och juridiska kontexten när det har fastställts att det rör sig om 
en uppenbar konkurrensbegränsning. Uppenbarheten i begränsningen kan 
först och främst härledas från avtalets art och en summarisk bedömning av 
omständigheterna relevanta för avtalet. Vägledning i relation till om 
begränsningen är uppenbar kan eventuellt hämtas från svaret på frågan om 
det, utan en exakt definition marknaden, är möjligt att fastställa att 
företagens marknadsandel vida överstiger 5 %. Utöver att definiera 
marknaden för att uppfylla rekvisiten i 2 kap. 1 § KL och Art. 101(1) FEUF 
krävs det att marknaden definieras tillräckligt precist för att uppfylla det 
grundläggande kravet på rättssäkerhet.  
Att tillämpa märkbarhetskravet i mål som rör syftesöverträdelser har varit 
omdebatterat inom EU. Det verkar dock som om domstolarna i både Sverige 
och EU har slagit fast att det är nödvändigt att tillämpa rekvisitet i 
förhållande till såväl syftes- som effektöverträdelser. 
Märkbarhetsbedömningen är uppdelad i kvantitativ och en kvalitativ del. 
Den kvantitativa aspekten tar hänsyn till parternas position och betydelse på 
marknaden, samt marknadsstrukturen. Det finns ingen klar vägledning i 
riktlinjerna från EU eller praxis från domstolarna i Sverige och EU i 
förhållande till vilka marknadsandelar som krävs för att ett avtal inte ska 
anses märkbart vid syftesöverträdelser. De märkbara effekterna av ett avtal 
bör dock kunna börja ifrågasättas när marknadsandelarna rör sig under 5 %. 
I förhållande till den kvalitativa aspekten görs en bedömning om 
begränsningen i sig är tillräckligt är märkbar. Analysen tar hänsyn till 
avtalets natur och om det finns några objektivt konstaterbara inskränkningar 
på konkurrensbegränsningen.  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
Ch. 2, 1 § of the Swedish Competition Act1 (2 ch. 1 § SCA) prohibits 
agreements between undertakings, which have as their object or effect, the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the market to an 
appreciable extent. The purpose of the prohibition is to hinder conduct, 
which may be considered contrary to effective competition, and is based on 
the assumption that free competition provides benefits for society and 
consumers. The prohibition makes a distinction between agreements, which 
have as their object or effect the restriction of competition. The distinction is 
based on the fact that certain types of agreements are considered to be 
inherently harmful and therefore presumed to negatively influence the 
market. Hence, once it has been established that an agreement has a 
restrictive object, it is not necessary to prove any actual effects. This 
provides an investigatory relief for the party alleging a restriction of 
competition.  However, it is still necessary to determine whether the 
agreement may appreciably effect competition. The fact that an agreements 
may escape the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA, and Art. 101(1) Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union2 (TFEU), if the effects are not 
appreciable, has been referred to as the de minimis principle.3  
 
The necessity to consider the appreciable extent of restrictions by object can 
be viewed either in a more legalistic or formalistic manner, drawing a line 
between allowed and prohibited agreements based on the legal assessment 
of their nature. A more economics approach, however, put more emphasize 
on the ability of the agreement to influence the market, and the appreciable 
effect as a minimum requirement of influence. Requiring the determination 
of appreciable effects in cases of object restrictions may be considered 
counter-intuitive as the object category is based on the inherent harm of the 
agreements therein. Similarly, it may seem contradictory to presume effects 
of an object restriction, thereby providing an investigatory relief, but at the 
same time require appreciable effects to be proven, providing an obligation 
to determine the ability to effect the market. These issues are discussed 
throughout the paper with the ambition to provide clarity in the assessment 
of the concept ‘to an appreciable extent’. 
 
                                                
1 Konkurrenslag SFS 2008:579 [KonkL] Competition Act 2:1 (Swed.). 
2 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 115, 
9.5.2008, p. 47–388. What is now the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has 
throughout history been amended. With the amendments the article number has been 
changed from Article 85, to Article 81 and now Article 101.Throughout this paper I will 
refer to the prohibition by using the current numbering, with the exception of quotes or 
names of EU documents, such as Regulations or Guidelines. 
3 The metaphor of a safe harbour has been used to describe the scope of the de minimis 
principle. 
 9 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
The general purpose of this paper is to examine the interpretation and 
application of the requirement that an agreement, which has as its object the 
restriction of competition, must have an appreciable effect on the market in 
order to be prohibited by the Swedish competition rules. The purpose may 
be divided into two parts. First, I attempt to determine to what extent it is 
necessary to define the relevant market, once it has been established that an 
agreement restricts competition by object, in order to satisfy the 
appreciability condition. This part of the paper address the issues of whether 
it is necessary to define the relevant market at all in these cases, and if so, 
examine how rigorous the market analysis should be. Second, I attempt to 
determine whether there exists a safe harbour for agreements with a 
restrictive object. This part address whether any quantitative or qualitative 
thresholds may be deduced from the preparatory work of the SCA or from 
the European Union (EU) and Swedish case law. Moreover, I seek to 
determine what quantitative and qualitative factors to consider in the 
assessment of the appreciability condition. 
Consequently, this paper answers the following three related research 
questions: 
 
1) At what depth and sophistication must a market analysis be conducted in 
order to establish an appreciable effect, when an agreement restricts 
competition by object?  
 
2) Is there a quantitative and qualitative safe harbour for agreements, 
which have as their object the restriction of competition? 
 
3) What quantitative and qualitative factors are relevant in the assessment 
of appreciability? 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
This paper has as its primary focus competition as it stands today in 
Sweden. However, I initially describe the legal history of the European and 
Swedish competition rules as well as its recent changes, in order to place the 
current legislation into perspective. I also present some of the economic 
theory underlying the competition rules as a means to provide a general 
understanding of what consequences competition, or a lack thereof, may 
have on the market. These sections are necessarily brief, and the description 
limited in scope and depth. Due to the focus of the paper, the majority of the 
arguments and reasoning is put forward to determine the current 
interpretation and application of the prohibition (de lege lata), and will not 
be prospective, relating to how the prohibition should be interpreted or 
applied (de lege ferenda). However, certain sections will provide 
suggestions regarding the interpretation of 2 ch. 1 § SCA and Art. 101(1) 
TFEU. 
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2 ch. 1 § SCA may generally be divided into three conditions. First, there 
must be an agreement between at least two undertakings (the agreement 
condition). Second, the agreement must restrict competition either by object 
or effect (the restriction of competition condition). Third, the agreement has 
to restrict competition to an appreciable extent (the appreciability 
condition). This paper focuses on the appreciable effects of an agreement, 
which has as its object the restriction of competition. The restriction of 
competition condition will only be discussed in order to get a general 
understanding of what constitutes a restriction by object. The agreement 
condition or appreciability condition in relation to trade between Member 
States is not considered in detail and is only referred to when necessary for 
general understanding of the paper. Lastly, I do not consider the exception 
that administrative fines may not be imposed on undertakings in minor cases 
according to 3 ch. 7(3) § SCA. Further minor delimitations are used 
throughout to limit the scope of the paper.  
1.4 Method and Material 
The method used in this paper is a traditional legal method. Essentially, this 
means that I examine the research questions above systematically according 
to legislation, preparatory works, case law and doctrine. The basis for the 
examination is 2 ch. 1 § SCA, prohibiting agreements that to an appreciable 
extent restrict competition. The preparatory works, the case law and doctrine 
are used, in that order of relevance, to analyse how the concept ‘to an 
appreciable extent’ has been interpreted and applied in Swedish competition 
law. Much of the focus is on case law where the boundaries of the relevant 
concepts, such as restrictions by object and ‘to an appreciable extent’, have 
been drawn. The aim is primarily be to determine the law as it stands today, 
i.e. determining de lege lata. The material in chapter 2 - 6 is, therefore, 
mainly descriptive. The last chapter consists of the main analysis, answering 
the researched questions. 
 
EU Treaty law, secondary law, such as Council and Commission 
Regulations, case law and other instruments, such as Commission 
guidelines, notices and communications are used throughout the paper in 
order to interpret the Swedish Competition law. As is further addressed in 
section 2.4, the EU competition law plays an important role in the 
understanding and application of the SCA. Therefore, the paper is heavily 
influenced by EU competition law, and case law from the EU courts will be 
used interpreting the Swedish competition rules, The reliance on case law 
from the EU courts is particularly prominent in parts where the Swedish 
case law is scarce. Because of the influence by EU competition law, and 
considering that the Swedish competition rules forms part of the EU 
competition network, the language of this paper is English. 
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The selection of materials used in this paper varies based on the issue being 
examined. As an example, case law is the primary focus in sections 
concerning the boundaries of concepts such as ‘to an appreciable extent’ and 
‘market definition’, as the scope of these concepts generally has been 
defined through case law. On the other hand, the chapter addressing 
economic theory is to a large extent based on economic literature, as these 
theories have been formed through economic doctrine.  
  
1.5 Outline 
The paper consists of six chapters relating to the substance of the research 
questions (Chapter 2 - 7).  
 
The second chapter briefly examines the legal and economic background of 
the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and Art. 101(1) TFEU. It addresses the 
relationship between legal and economic theory and discuss the necessity to 
apply economic reasoning in application of competition law. It also 
discusses the relationship between Swedish and EU competition law. 
 
The third chapter describes some of the economic theory underlying 
competition law. The theory of perfect competition is used to illustrate the 
consequences market power may have on the market.   
 
Chapter four considers what constitutes a restriction of competition by 
object. The reasoning behind using a presumption-based rule in relation to 
object restrictions is addressed. Lastly, some agreements are examined that, 
although prima facie could be considered to restrict competition, may fall 
outside the scope of the prohibition. 
 
The fifth chapter provides a thorough analysis of the depth and 
sophistication needed, once a restrictive object has been established, to 
establish that an agreement may restrict competition to an appreciable 
extent. In addition, the concept of market power is defined. 
 
The sixth chapter considers the concept of ‘to an appreciable extent’ and 
what quantitative and qualitative factors are relevant for the assessment of 
the appreciability concept.  
 
The seventh chapter concludes with an analysis of the material presented 
throughout the paper and provides some clarity regarding the proposed 
researched questions. 
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2 Background  
2.1 Introduction  
In the interpretation and application of the Swedish competition rules it is 
often necessary to consider the underlying goals and purposes providing 
their legal and economic history. Considering the important role European 
competition law and case law from the EU courts have on the interpretation 
and application of Swedish competition rules, it is valuable to briefly 
examine the goals and purposes of the Treaty on the functioning of the 
European Union. The application of the appreciability condition may be 
viewed at in two different ways. First, it may be viewed at with a legalistic 
or formalistic perspective, dividing agreements into allowed of prohibited, 
based on a legal assessment of their nature. Second, the application of the 
condition may be viewed at with a more economic perspective focusing on 
the effects on the market and in particular the consumer interest. This 
chapter initially addresses the foundation of EU competition law and the 
move towards a more economically oriented approach. It further discusses 
the relationship between law and economics in the field of competition law. 
Thereafter, the foundation of Swedish competition law and the relationship 
between EU and Swedish competition law is examined.  
 
2.2 The Foundation of European 
Competition Law 
2.2.1 Background 
European competition policy is based on the concept of a ‘social market 
economy’, which is ingrained in the EU. Article 2(3) TFEU states that  
 
[…] It [the EU] shall work for the sustainable development of 
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, 
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full 
employment and social progress, and a high level of protection 
and improvement of the quality of the environment.4 
 
This general aim of the treaty is based on the assumption that the market 
mechanism is the best way to encourage innovation and productivity. 
Furthermore, it seeks to achieve the full potential of undertakings in terms 
of efficiency, which in turn will provide social and consumer welfare.5 The 
recognition of these benefits as a result of competitive markets is largely 
shared throughout the world.  
                                                
4 Article 3(2) TFEU. 
5 Hildebrand, page 2, See also Whish, page 3f. 
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There are currently more than 120 systems of competition law in the world 
governing the interactions on the various markets.6 
 
Even though there is a great reliance in the market mechanism to provide 
the above-mentioned benefits, this is not to say that the European approach 
towards competition is characterized as a fully deregulated and liberal 
market. According to Hildebrand, the European school of thought and the 
‘social market economy’ was based on ordoliberalism and the Freiburg 
school of thought. It emphasizes a liberal market process, but within a legal 
institutional framework with a constitutional basis. Competition law creates 
this necessary structure, which allows the competitive process to provide 
benefits for society.7 The ordoliberal system enables the market to, as far as 
possible within the legal framework, regulate itself, with state intervention 
only where the market is unable to provide sufficient competitive pressure.8 
 
2.2.2 A Variety of Goals 
As noted, competition law may be seen as a means to achieve a social 
market economy. The utility of competition, and competition rules, rests on 
a foundation built on a variety of goals. Geradin and others note that, 
although consumer welfare is particularly prevalent in the latest application 
of the competition rules, the prohibition of undistorted competition is a 
multifaceted concept that may include a variety of goals such as fairness, 
freedom, efficiency and consumer welfare.9 In Anic10 the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) stated that inherent in the provisions of the 
TFEU is the concept that every economic operator must determine the 
policy which he intends to adopt on the market independently. Hence, an 
agreement restricts competition when it limits the freedom of one or more 
undertakings to determine their policy and where the object or effect of the 
contact between the undertakings is to ‘create conditions of competition 
which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question, 
regard being had to the nature of the products and services offered, the size 
and number of the undertakings and the volume of the said market.’11 This 
statement may be viewed as an expression of the underlying goal of 
freedom, where restrictions of the actions of undertakings should be 
prevented. The specific purpose of the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU is, 
in addition to the economic goal of preventing restrictions of competition, to 
prevent restrictions on trade between Member States in order to promote 
integration across the borders.12 
                                                
6 Whish, page 3. 
7 Hildebrand, page 159ff.  
8 Ibid, page 1ff.  
9 Geradin and others, page 23, paragraph 1.70-1.72, The book is published 2012 and the 
latest development should be viewed as the time recently predating the publishing of the 
book. 
10 Case C-49/92 P Commission of the European Communities v Anic Partecipazioni SpA 
[1999] E.C.R. I-04125. 
11 Anic [1999] paragraph 117. 
12 Bishop & Walker, page 4ff. paragraph 1-004 – 1-006. 
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The goal to protect the interest of consumers is apparent in the guidelines on 
Article 81(3) where the Commission states, ‘the objective of Article 81 is to 
protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.’13 In this 
connection, Eklöf argues that it would be politically troublesome not to have 
the consumer aim.14  
 
2.2.3 The Relationship Between Competition 
Law and Economics 
Competition law is intrinsically linked with economic theory and economic 
analysis. Competition law may be viewed as the vehicle used to translate the 
economic models into reality on the markets.15 The link between 
competition law and economics is further evidenced by the way economic 
concepts, such as efficiency, market power but also appreciability, are used 
in the discussion and application of competition law.16 Consequently, these 
concepts should not be assessed in isolation from economic theory, but 
demand an accompanying economic analysis.  
 
Competition law and economic theory have been recognized as being 
unpredictable and hard to evaluate because of its reliance on assumptions.17 
Crandall & Winston argued that, within the American context, little 
empirical evidence supported that past intervention had provided consumer 
benefits or significantly deterred anticompetitive behaviour.18 They 
therefore argued that competition authorities would be well advised to 
prosecute only the most egregious violations of competition until hard 
evidence can be adduced that identifies what enforcement actions improve 
consumer welfare.19 This view was criticised by Baker who stated that 
although there is not enough evidence to determine the robustness of 
competition law, 
 
[…] The presumption should be in favor of antitrust 
enforcement as it is conducted today, with substantial input from 
economists at the antitrust agencies and in the courts both in 
resolving individual cases and in the development of antitrust 
rules.20  
 
                                                
13 Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 13. 
14 Eklöf, Konkurrensbegreppet och konsumentvälfärden, 18f. 
15 Hildebrand, page 164. 
16 Peeperkorn, Luc and Verouden, Vincent, ‘The Economics of Competition’, In: Faull & 
Nikpay, page 4, paragraph 1.01. 
17 See Neven, page 1ff. 
18 Crandall & Winston, page 4. 
19 Ibid, page 4. 
20 Baker, page 32. 
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The record from the EU case law shows that effective cartels can create 
substantial harm and that leniency programs may help prosecuting cartels 
that otherwise would remain secret.21 In light of the relatively recent 
changes in European competition law and policy, the use of economic 
reasoning and the explicit use of economic arguments have increased.22 
Empirical evidence has been used to support economic theories and remove 
some of the uncertainties due to their underlying assumptions.23 Peeperkorn 
and Verouden note that while economic theories and models may not 
always give clear and definitive answers, they provide a coherent 
framework of analysis and help to tell the most plausible story.24 
 
2.3 A More Economic Approach 
The necessity and importance of economic analysis, as noted in the previous 
section, have been more and more accepted within the EU context. Since the 
late 1990s the Commission has moved from a more forms-based approach 
to what has been known as the ‘economics-based approach’25. Between 
1962 and 2004 agreements could be exempted from the prohibition in Art. 
101(1) TFEU either by EU block exemption regulations or by receiving an 
individual exemption. The exemption system was based on notifications to 
the Commission where Regulation no 17 gave the Commission exclusive 
competence to grant individual exemptions under Art. 101(3) TFEU. This 
approach led to notifications in excess of 30,000 in the early 1960s.26 Due to 
lack of resources the Commission was therefore forced to take a categorical 
approach in determining which agreements should benefit from the 
exemption. This resulted in an approach that did not consider the different 
effects of similar agreements and threatened to deter pro-competitive 
agreements.27 Hence, in the 1970s and 80s the European institutions tended 
to apply economic principles in an imprecise ad hoc manner.28 The 
administrative burden led the Commission to adopted regulations providing 
block exemptions and a de minimis notice.29  
 
In the Green Paper on vertical restraints presented in 1996 the Commission 
recognized the necessity, and pro-competitive effects, of many vertical 
agreements.30 The Commission noted that consensus was emerging amongst 
economists that vertical agreements could neither be seen as per se 
suspicious, nor per se pro-competitive.31  
                                                
21 Neven, page 2f. 
22 Ibid, page 1ff. 
23 Bishop & Walker, page 3f. 
24 Peeperkorn, Luc and Verouden, Vincent, ‘The Economics of Competition’, In: Faull & 
Nikpay, page 4, paragraph 1.03-1.04. 
25 Geradin and others, page 19, paragraph 1.60. 
26 Green Paper on vertical restraints, Exec summary page Iv, paragraph 15. 
27 Alison, page 787ff.  
28 Bishop & Walker, page 3f. 
29 Ehlermann, paragraph 9. 
30 Green Paper on vertical restraints, Exec. Summary page I, paragraph 2. 
31 Ibid, Exec. Summary page I, paragraph 10. 
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According to the Commission, the market structure stood out as being 
generally important in the assessment of these agreements. Anti-competitive 
effects were considered more likely where inter-brand competition was 
weak and where there were entry barriers.32 The Commission reached, inter 
alia, the conclusion that, 
  
Analysis should concentrate on the impact on the market rather 
than the form of the agreement. For example, whether entry is 
foreclosed by a network of agreements or whether the vertical 
agreement coupled with market power permit producers or 
distributors to practice price discrimination between Member 
States.33 
 
However, the Commission further stated that economic theory is only one 
source of policy and that an individual assessment of every case ‘would be 
too costly in resource terms and may lead to legal insecurity’34. Focusing on 
impact, and necessarily economic analysis of effects, could also result in the 
additional cost of reduced legal certainty.35  
 
Even though the Commission took steps towards a more economic 
approach, absolute territorial protection and resale price maintenance were 
still considered to fall per se within Art. 101(1) TFEU and unlikely to be 
exempted.36 The Green Paper on vertical restraints has been considered to 
mark the change towards a more economic based approach.37 With 
Regulation 1/2003 the Commission relinquished its exclusive power to 
provide individual exemptions and abolished the notification system. 
Furthermore, the guidelines on Article 81(3) were introduced in 2004, which 
has considered to bring a more coherent economic framework in the 
analysis of Art. 101(1) and Art. 101(3) TFEU and put more emphasize on 
consumer welfare as the objective of Art. 101(1) TFEU.38  
 
In its White paper on modernisation the Commission stated that it had to 
‘[…] refocus its activities on combating the most serious restrictions of 
competition […]’39 Ehlerman noted, in a comment to the Commission White 
paper on modernisation, that it was generally considered that the 
Commission had interpreted ‘restriction of competition’ too broadly in the 
past but that it had indicated that it would take a less formalistic approach in 
favour of an approach giving more weight to the economic reality.40  
 
                                                
32 Ibid, Exec. Summary page iii, paragraph 10. 
33 Ibid, Exec. Summary page iii-iv. 
34 Ibid, Exec. Summary page iv. 
35 Geradin and others, page 19, paragraph 23. 
36 Green Paper on vertical restraints, Exec. Summary page x. 
37 Alison, page 789, Peeperkorn, Luc and Verouden, Vincent, ‘The Economics of 
Competition’, In: Faull & Nikpay, page 220, paragraph 3.136. 
38 Alison, page 790. 
39 White Paper on Modernisation, paragraph 42. 
40 Ehlermann, page 16. 
 17 
In conclusion, it seems as though the Commission has 1) moved towards an 
approach characterized by reliance in economic theory and market analysis, 
in order to determine the impact an agreement may ultimately have on the 
consumer, and 2) narrowed its scope of interpretation in relation to the 
concept ‘restriction of competition’ and refocused its resources on the 
agreements that represents the greatest harm to the market and the 
consumer.  
 
Even though the Commission has taken steps towards a more economics-
based approach, it may take time before this change is reflected in the 
European and national courts.41 In GlaxoSmithKleine42 the General Court 
(GC) used consumer welfare as a benchmark standard in the assessment of 
Art. 101(1) TFEU arguing that the objective of Art. 101(1) TFEU was to 
prevent the undertakings from reducing the welfare of final consumers.43 
Nikpay and others noted that this development was welcome and, arguably, 
long overdue.44 However, the judgement of the GC was overturned by 
CJEU stating that neither the wording of Art. 101(1) TFEU nor the case law 
supports a view that the object category depends on whether an agreement 
may be presumed to deprive final consumers of the advantages of effective 
competition. Instead the court stated that Art. 101 TFEU aims to protect the 
market structure and competition as such, as well as consumers and 
competitors. It was therefore not considered necessary that final consumers 
were deprived of the advantage of effective competition.45 The CJEU 
judgement indicates that the court has not followed in the footsteps of the 
Commission adopting the more effects-based approach with the consumer 
welfare focus in mind. Although, it may also confirm the complexity and 
plurality of the goals of EU competition policy.46  
 
2.4  The Swedish Approach 
The history of Swedish competition rules dates back to 1925 when the first 
legislation regarding the investigation of monopolies was introduced.47 
During the 1990s Sweden moved closer to the collaboration in Europe and 
in connection with the Swedish accession to the EU, a new Competition Act 
entered into force in 1993.48 When the act was introduced the Government 
deemed competition in many important parts of the economy to be 
inadequate and stated that it was necessary to create more suitable 
conditions in order to promote competition.49  
                                                
41 Peeperkorn, Luc and Verouden, Vincent, ‘The Economics of Competition’, In: Faull & 
Nikpay, page 222, paragraph 3.143. 
42 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKleine Services Unlimited v Commission of the European 
Communities [2006] E.C.R. II-02969 
43 GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2006] paragraph 118. 
44 Nikpay and others, ‘Article 81’, in: Faull & Nikpay, page 220, paragraph 3.138. 
45 GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2009], paragraph 62-63. 
46 Alison, page 792. 
47 Gustafsson, page 17. 
48 Ibid, page 18. 
49 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 4f. 
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With the introduction of the SCA it was stated that a natural starting point, 
when proposing the new SCA, was the convergence to EU competition 
rules. The Government pointed out that Swedish companies conducting 
business on the EU market was already affected by the EU competition 
rules. It stated that the SCA should be modelled after, and conformed to, 
Art. 101(1) and 102 TFEU.50 The aim was to as far as possible achieve 
substantive conformity with the EU competition rules, with the obvious 
exception of the condition ‘may affect trade’. The SCA therefore rest on 
much of the same purposes as the TFEU with the exception of the 
integration goal. In the interpretation of the SCA the Government held that 
the EU case law, and case law from other countries applying a prohibition 
principle, could provide guidance in the application of the substantive 
rules.51 The Government argued that the utility of competition was that it 
stimulates markets in order to better utilize the resources of society. By 
putting pressure on prices and broadening the range of supplies competition 
was considered to bring consumer benefits.52  
 
With the modernization of the competition rules within EU and especially 
the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, the Government appointed an inquiry 
to examine the application of the Competition Act. The inquiry resulted in a 
new Competition Act that entered into force 2008 and is currently 
applicable.53 Regulation 1/2003 brought the application of TFEU and SCA 
even closer as it enabled the Member States Authorities to apply Art. 101(1) 
and 101(3) TFEU in their entirety.54 It further obligated the Member States 
Authorities to apply TFEU and SCA in parallel once an agreement affect 
trade between Member States.55 Similar to the goals of EU competition law, 
the general aim of the SCA is to strengthen competition in order to improve 
social and consumer welfare.56 Effective competition is the adequate 
benchmark in the test to determi ne whether or not certain conduct restricts 
competition to an appreciable extent.57 1 ch. 1 § SCA states, ‘The purpose 
of this Act is to eliminate and counteract obstacles to effective competition 
in the field of production of and trade in goods, services and other 
products.’58 
 
 
                                                
50 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 19. 
51 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 21. 
52 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 4. 
53 Gustafsson, page 18f. 
54 Regulation 1/2003, recital 4, Article 6. 
55 Regulation 1/2003, Article. 
56 Prop. 2007/2008:135, page 67. 
57 Prop. 2007/2008:135, page 66. 
58 1 ch. 1 § SCA (English translation). 
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3 Competition Economics 
3.1 Introduction 
As noted, economics has become more important in the EU competition law 
and there has been an increase in focus and reliance on economic analysis. 
As the application moves towards a more effects based and consumer 
oriented approach the economic theory becomes increasingly important, as 
the foundation for the economic reasoning.  The concept of ‘restriction of 
competition’ is fundamentally an economic concept that which generally 
requires an economic evaluation.59 Similarly, the determination of the 
appreciable effects of an agreement also has its basis in economic theory. 
Throughout the 20th century many different schools of thought and 
economic models were used analysing competition law.60 However, in order 
to illustrate the negative impact restrictions of competition may have on the 
market, this paper applies the neoclassical model, where perfect competition 
and monopoly exist as the two opposite poles of the market.61 The model 
provides a static illustration of the inefficiencies that may arise when a 
market moves from perfect competition towards a market characterized by 
monopoly. There are two main criticisms of this market rendition; it is a 
static model and does not take into account dynamic efficiencies of 
innovation and technological progress62, it is also based on unrealistic 
assumptions rarely, if ever, present in the real markets.63  
 
With this criticism in mind it should be pointed out that the model is not 
used in the application of competition law, but is instead used to illustrate 
the economic consequences of market power. The perfect competition 
model has been regarded as helpful in illustrating the economic 
consequences that may arise with market power. Bishop and Walker notes,  
 
While neither of these models [perfect competition and 
monopoly] provides a good description of the competitive 
process in most industries, they can be used to illustrate some 
of the basic economic concepts that enable one to judge 
whether intervention by competition law authorities is likely to 
improve consumer welfare.64 
 
                                                
59 Whish, page 117. 
60 See inter alia the Harvard school of thought, the Chicago school of thought and the 
theory of contestable market. Hildebrand, page 95ff. 
61 Geradin and others, page 62, paragraph 2.10-2.11, See also Hildebrand, page 104ff., 
Peeperkorn and Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’, in Faull & Nikpay, page 18, 
paragraph 1.54. 
62 Bishop & Walker, page 45, paragraph 2-036. 
63 Hildebrand, page 22, paragraph 2-009. 
64 Bishop & Walker, page 21f, paragraph 2-009, See also Peeperkorn and Verouden, ‘The 
Economics of Competition’, in Faull & Nikpay, page 18, paragraph 1.54. 
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The following section, describing perfect competition and monopoly, 
provides an overview that will offer an economic basis for the reasoning 
throughout the paper, but is, however, not the main focus of this paper. It 
will therefore necessarily be brief. The text is mainly based on Bishop and 
Walker, ‘The Economics of EC competition law’65 and Geradin and others, 
‘EU Competition Law and Economics’66. Although, most of the basic 
reasoning can be found with many authors on the same subject.67 
 
3.2 Perfect Competition  
Perfect competition may be described as a state where the market 
mechanism of supply and demand works perfectly. Geradin and others 
argues that there are five criteria necessary for perfect competition in a 
given market. These are: 
 
1. Large number of sellers and buyers 
2. Homogenous products 
3. Perfect information  
4. Free entry (no entry barriers), and 
5. No transportation costs68 
 
Due to the competitive pressure on the market, prices are driven down to the 
marginal cost of the firm, including a sufficient profit for the producer to 
have had incentives to invest capital in the industry in the first place.69 
Under these conditions a buyer would turn to a competitor if a firm decided 
to increase the price above marginal cost. Would the firm instead decide to 
lower the price below marginal cost it would not be able to achieve 
sustainable profitability and be forced to exit the market.70 A market with 
perfect competition would therefore, based on the model, maximize 
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and increase consumer welfare, 
which is further explained in the next section on monopoly.71 A more 
controversial and debated question is whether perfect competition induces 
dynamic efficiencies.72 The static model of perfect competition used in this 
paper does not consider dynamic issues such as innovation or the change in 
products or processes.73 Neither is it the purpose of this paper to analyse 
efficiencies on the market. Hence, the question of dynamic efficiency is not 
further analysed in this paper. 
                                                
65 Bishop & Walker. 
66 Geradin and others. 
67 See Faull & Nikpay, page 18-23, paragraph. 1.54 - 1.74, Whish, page 3-9. 
68 Geradin and others, page 64, paragraph 2.16. 
69 Bishop & Walker, page 22, paragraph 2-009, in particular footnote 21, See also Whish, 
page 5. 
70 See Geradin and others, page 64f., paragraph 2.17 – 2.18. 
71 Bishop & Walker, page 24ff.  
72 Geradin and others, page 67f., paragraph 2.25-2.27, See also Whish, page 5f, Faull & 
Nikpay, page 36ff. paragraph 1.117ff., Eklöf, Konkurrensbegreppet och 
konsumentvälfärden, page 20. 
73 Bishop & Walker, page 45, paragraph 2-036. 
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3.3 Monopoly  
A monopoly market is characterized by another set of assumptions. Instead 
of multiple sellers there is only one firm producing the total quantity traded 
on the market. Furthermore, there are entry barriers limiting other firms to 
establish their business on the market.74 Under these conditions the 
monopoly firm has the ability, due to market power, to affect the market in a 
way that would not be possible under perfect competition conditions. 
Assuming that the firm is profit maximizing, it will, according to economic 
theory, set its prices where the marginal cost intersects the marginal 
revenue. The firm may limit production or raise the prices in order to 
achieve maximal profits.75 A cartel may in this connection be seen as a ‘[…] 
monopoly comprised of several undertakings working in concert organized 
by means of an agreement to restrict production and keep prices high 
[…]’76, which creates analogous effects to a monopoly by an individual 
undertaking.77 
 
The behaviour of monopoly firms result in several market inefficiencies and 
welfare losses; effects which are the fundamental aim of competition law to 
prevent.78 The first consequence is that the restricted production creates 
allocation inefficiencies and therefore a total, or social, welfare loss. With 
the restricted output resulting in higher prices there will be consumers on 
the market valuing the product at a level above its marginal cost but under 
the monopoly price. The outcome is a surplus of demand that, while not 
currently satisfied, could be satisfied with a better allocation of resources, 
commonly referred to as a dead weight loss.79 The second consequence 
relates to the increase in price for consumers as a result of firms being able 
to maximize profits. The increase in price leads to a redistribution of the 
consumer surplus that is created by the disparity between the valuation of a 
certain product and its marginal cost. As an effect of the monopoly, 
consumer surplus will decrease and the producer surplus increase. This is in 
itself not a social welfare loss but a redistribution of welfare, which results 
in consumer welfare loss.80 A third consequence is that the monopolist may, 
when free from competitive pressure, acquire production costs higher than 
the marginal cost on a highly competitive market. In other words, the 
market power allows the firm to maintain a less effective production, known 
as productive inefficiency.  
                                                
74 Peeperkorn and Verouden, ‘The Economics of Competition’, in Faull & Nikpay, page 20, 
paragraph 1.62, See also Bishop & Walker, page 26, paragraph 2-013. 
75 Bishop & Walker, page 26, paragraph 2-014. 
76 Geradin and others, page 66, paragraph 2.22. 
77 Ibid, page 66, paragraph 2.22. 
78 Ibid, page 66ff., paragraph 2.23-2.27. 
79Ibid, page 66, paragraph 2.23, Eklöf, Konkurrensbegreppet och konsumentvälfärden, page 
19. 
80 Eklöf, Konkurrensbegreppet och konsumentvälfärden, page 19. 
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The production costs would then consume the redistributed consumer 
surplus, instead of resulting in producer profits, and ultimately lead to a 
social welfare loss.81 
 
In conclusion, the neoclassical model shows that negative effects on the 
market may arise as a result of a maintained or strengthened ability to 
influence the market. As is further discussed in section 5.5, market power is 
commonly defined as the ability to raise prices above levels that would 
predominate under competitive conditions. Consequently, the condition that 
an agreement must appreciably effect competition is strongly connected 
with the economic theory concerning the ability to exert an influence on the 
market. The condition provides a minimum threshold necessary for 
undertakings to be theoretically able to negatively effect competition on a 
properly defined market.  
 
                                                
81 Geradin and others, page 66f., paragraph 2.24, See also Bishop & Walker, page 25, pp. 2-
012, Compare Eklöf, Konkurrensbegreppet och konsumentvälfärden, page 28. 
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4 Restriction of Competition 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to determine how the condition of appreciable 
effect is interpreted and applied in relation to restrictions by object. Hence, 
it is necessary to determine what constitutes an object restriction, why there 
is a division between effect and object restrictions and how object 
restrictions are established.  
 
The condition, that a restriction of competition must be appreciable, is stated 
directly in the SCA. 2 ch. 1 § SCA states,  
 
Agreements between undertakings shall be prohibited if they 
have as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of competition in the market to an appreciable extent, 
if not otherwise regulated in this act.82 
 
2 ch. 1 § SCA may be divided into three conditions that must be satisfied in 
order to apply the prohibition. First, there must be an agreement between at 
least two undertakings, a decision by an association of undertakings or 
concerted practices (the agreement condition). Second, the conduct must 
have a restrictive object or effects (the restriction of competition condition). 
Third, competition must be restricted to an appreciable extent (the 
appreciability condition).83 However, although it may be useful to divide the 
second and third condition into different assessments, it is important to keep 
in mind that the parts are highly connected and inter-dependent. Art. 101(1) 
TFEU was in early case law described as an ‘indivisible whole’84 and it was 
stated that the two concepts object and effect ‘seek to identify the same 
consequence of collusion: restriction of competition’85. The aim of the 
analysis in 2 ch. 1 § SCA should therefore, regardless of the theoretical 
framework of analysis used, ultimately determine whether or not 
competition has been restricted on a given market. 
  
                                                
82 2 ch. 1 § SCA (English translation). 
83 See Prop. 1992/93:56, page 20. 
84 Geus [1962] page 6. 
85 Kolstad, page 3. 
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4.2 Object Restriction 
4.2.1 Introduction 
2 ch. 1 § SCA prohibits agreements that have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition. The conditions ‘object or effect’ are alternative 
and not cumulative. It is therefore not necessary to show the effects of an 
agreement on the market once a restrictive object has been established.86 In 
other words, once it has been established that an agreement has as its object 
the restriction of competition the effects on the market will be presumed.87 
The presumption is based on the inherently harmful nature of certain 
agreements, ‘as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal 
competition’88, and provides an investigatory relief for the party alleging an 
infringement of the prohibition.89 Similar reasoning is provided in the 
guidelines on Article 81(3), where the Commission states that the 
presumption is based on ‘the serious nature of the restriction and on 
experience showing that restrictions of competition by object […]’90.  
 
The reference to experience indicates that past effects of similar agreements 
are relevant factors when determining if an agreement has as its object the 
restriction of competition. Many commentators agree that experience may 
indicate that certain agreements have anti-competitive effects.91 Bailey 
argues, however, that the combination of economic analysis, empirical 
research, experiences from other jurisdictions and policy judgements forms 
the basis for infringements by object.92 Even though the object category 
provides an investigatory relief through the presumption of effects, Zenger 
and Walker points out that the agreements should not be categorized as 
object restrictions in order to avoid the requirement to specify the theory of 
harm.93 Instead, a theory of harm should be provided also in cases of object 
restrictions because of the benefits it brings; it focus on harm to competitors 
instead of competition do not survive; it concentrate on conduct where the 
involved firms have incentive and ability to act anti-competitively; it 
emphasize empirical evidence that is required to underpin potential 
competition concern.94 
 
                                                
86 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 72, Prop. 2007/2008:135, page 71, Norsk Hydro [2005], page 20, 
See also BIDS [2008], paragraph 15. 
87 Kolstad, page 4ff. 
88 BIDS [2008] paragraph 17. 
89 Ibid, paragraph 17. 
90 Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 21. 
91 Bennett and others, page 3f. 
92 Bailey, page 4. 
93 Zenger and Walker, page 29. 
94 Ibid, page 29. 
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The number of agreement types that are regarded to be injurious by their 
very nature is limited.95 However, even though the number of agreements 
may be limited, cases framed in ‘object terms’ are overrepresented in the 
decisional practice of the Commission. In a review of the Commission 
decisions between January 2000 and January 2011 it was pointed out that 17 
out of 18 infringement decisions made by the Commission were framed in 
‘object terms’.96 Hence, the assessment of the appreciable effect of an 
agreement with a restrictive object is highly relevant. 
 
4.2.2 Establishing a Restrictive Object  
In KIA97 the MC stated that in order to determine whether or not an 
agreement restricts competition it is necessary to conduct an objective 
assessment of the agreement, taking into account the actual and economic 
context as well as the actions of the parties.98 Similarly, in 
GlaxoSmithKline99 the CJEU held that the provisions of the agreement, the 
objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal context must be 
taken into account.100  
 
The necessity to consider the context, and not only the nature, of an object 
restriction was clearly stated Football Association Premier League101, where 
the CJEU stated in a grand chamber judgement that the agreement was 
deemed to have a restrictive object ‘[…] unless other circumstances falling 
within its economic and legal context justify the finding that such an 
agreement is not liable to impair competition.’102 The statement is clear in 
that certain contextual circumstances may justify that even a restriction by 
object escapes the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU.  
 
  
                                                
95 Whish, page 117, Bailey, page 1. 
96 Gerard. 
97 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2012:13 (Swed.) Sveriges Bildelsgrossisters 
förening v KIA Motors Sweden AB. 
98 KIA [2012] page 26, See also Assistancekåren [2007] page 4, where the MC, referring to 
EG case law, stated that the actual context must be considered, taking into account the legal 
and economic context when assessing an alleged restriction of competition., See also Bil-
Bengtsson and others [2008] page 13 – 16, where the MC conducted a thorough analysis of 
the applicants argument relating to whether of not the agreement had as its object the 
restriction of competition.  
99 Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline 
Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2009] E.C.R. I-09291 
100 GlaxoSmithKline [2009] paragraph 58, Similarly, the CJEU has stated that in order to 
determine the anti-competitive nature of an agreement it is necessary to assess the objective 
meaning and purpose of the agreement in the economic context in which it is to be applied, 
See Compagnie Royale [1984] paragraph 26. 
101 Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd and 
Others v QC Leisure and Others [2011] E.C.R. Page 00000. 
102 Football Association Premier League [2011] paragraph 140. 
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In this connection it is worth pointing out that the object of the agreement 
does not relate to the subjective intent of the parties. The subjective intent Is 
not considered a relevant factor in the application of 2 ch. 1 § SCA.103 
However, in the application of Art. 101(1) TFEU, the subjective intent of 
the parties is considered ‘a relevant factor but not a necessary condition’104. 
It has, however, generally been used to condemn behaviour as a restriction 
of competition by object, and not in order to rebut the presumption of 
harm.105 The relevance of the subjective intention of the parties is based on 
the idea that conduct is more likely to result in a restriction of competition if 
the parties intentionally are working toward this end.106  
 
In addition to an objective analysis of the agreement in its context, an 
agreement may be classified as an object restriction by reference to the list 
of particularly harmful agreements in Art. 101(1) TFEU and 2 ch. 1 § SCA, 
to the ‘hardcore restrictions’ in the block exemption Regulations or to 
decided cases. These sources may be viewed as non-exhaustive guidance as 
to the classification of agreements as object restrictions and a good starting 
point in determining the object of an agreement.107  
4.2.3 Benefits and Criticism of Using a 
Presumption 
A presumption of effects provides a number of benefits. It has generally 
been stated that the distinction between object and effect is valuable due to 
the high risk of harm and the unlikelihood that agreements, which restrict 
competition by object, provides benefits. Furthermore, a case by case 
assessment of all agreements would place a high burden on firms as well as 
competition authorities and private plaintiffs to conduct economic and legal 
analyses.108 This may lead to firms being less inclined to enter into 
beneficial agreements because of the risk the competition rules pose. It 
could also lead to insufficient deterrence of anti-competitive behaviour by 
the competition authorities because of lack of resources.109 The object 
category therefore provides a relief from analysing the actual or potential 
effects of an agreement. Additionally, the object category provides legal 
certainty in that it more clearly points out the legal consequences of certain 
agreements.110  
 
  
                                                
103 See KIA [2012] paragraph 206, See also NCC and others [2009] page 48. 
104 Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 22, See also General Motors [2006] paragraphs 
77-78. 
105 Bailey, page 10. 
106 Odudu, page 121. 
107 Bailey, page 6ff.  
108 Bennett and others, page 7, See also Bailey, page 4f. 
109 Ibid, page 7. 
110 Bailey, page 4, Bennett and others, page 7ff. 
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Some of the criticism towards the object category is that the extended use of 
it goes beyond cases where agreements may be presumed, based on the 
inherently restrictive effect on competition, to be anti-competitive.111 
Zenger and Walker note that it might be tempting to characterize conduct as 
restrictions by object since it relieves the burden of providing a theory of 
harm. However, they state,  
 
But this is not how the object category was intended to be 
utilised. As the 101(3) Guidelines explain, genuine restrictions 
by object are agreements where the theory of harm is obvious 
and where competitive harm is a foregone conclusion.112  
 
Agreements, such as resale price maintenance agreements and restriction on 
parallel trade for the purpose of price discrimination, has been criticized for 
not justifying a presumption of harm.113 
 
4.2.4 Limitations Falling Outside the Scope of 
the Prohibition 
Certain types of limitations on undertakings to adopt their policies on the 
market, such as ancillary restraints, have been considered to fall outside the 
scope of the prohibition laid down in Art. 101(1) TFEU.114 The fact that 
certain agreements, that prima facie seem to restrict competition, have 
escaped the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU has led many commentators to 
question whether the courts have adopted a rule of reason approach in its 
assessment, balancing the pro- and anti-competitive effects in the 
assessment of Art. 101(1) TFEU.115 However, the EU courts have rejected 
this view.116 These cases may be considered to fall outside the scope of Art. 
101(1) TFEU either by stating that they do not restrict competition by object 
or effect, or by stating that the restriction is qualitatively insignificant. Wahl 
notes that the distinction of what does not constitute a restriction of 
competition at all and what does not constitute an appreciable restriction of 
competition is subtle but important. He further points out that it could be 
argued that the restriction of competition condition includes all restrictions 
of competition and that every exception should be considered a qualitative 
safe harbour. However, he states that this interpretation is too extensive.117 
                                                
111 Zenger & Walker, page 14ff., The authors argue that the view that restrictions of parallel 
trade, resale price maintenance and payment card multi-lateral card interchange fees should 
be presumed harmful is erroneous. 
112 Ibid, page 19. 
113 Ibid, page 14ff., However see also generally Bennett and others, in particular page 3f., 
who argue that resale price maintenance should not be removed from the category 
presuming harm. The statement is conditioned on that the presumption is truly rebuttable 
and where the competition authority set up at least one theory of harm consistent with the 
facts of the case. 
114 See section 4.2.5.2. 
115 Westin & Linder, page 2ff.  
116 European Night Services [1998] paragraph 136, MasterCard [2012] paragraph 80. 
117 Wahl, page 17f. 
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In the following I distinguish between agreements that do not restrict 
competition at all and those that do not appreciably restrict competition due 
to their qualitative insignificance. The category of agreements which do not 
restrict competition at all will be based on three categories put forward by 
Advocate General (AG) Trestenjak in BIDS118. In her opinion in BIDS, AG 
Trstenjak considered three categories of restrictions in which ‘the 
assumption of a restriction of competition may be rejected or at least 
doubtful on the basis of the factual or legal context.’119. These categories 
are: 
 
1. Agreements limiting the freedom of undertakings, but which has no 
effect on competition,  
2. Necessary restrictions in order to, inter alia, strengthen competition 
on a market, open up a market or allow a new competitor access to a 
market, and  
3. Ancillary arrangements which are necessary in order to pursue a 
primary objective.120  
 
In contrast to AG Trestenjak, I do not use category two and three above as 
two separate categories. This is because both categories cover exemptions 
where a restriction is considered necessary in order to achieve a desirable 
objective in competition terms. Therefore, I use the first and third category 
in the following sections in the examination of what agreements do fall 
outside the scope of the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU. This distinction, 
between agreements that do not restrict competition and agreements that do 
not restrict competition appreciably, should not be over-emphasized, as it 
merely provides a theoretical framework for the assessment of the ultimate 
goal to determine whether an agreement restricts competition to an 
appreciable extent.121  
 
4.2.4.1 Limitations With No Anti-Competitive Effects 
The assessment whether or not an agreement restricts competition is done ex 
ante, or in other words, the assessment is based on competition as it was at 
the time when the agreement was signed.122 In order for an agreement to 
restrict competition, it is therefore necessary that the parties to the 
agreement are actual or potential competitors on the relevant market or that 
the agreement may restrict third parties.123 In European Night Services, the 
GC rejected the argument that potential competition between the 
undertakings was restricted.  
 
                                                
118 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and 
Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] E.C.R. I-08637. 
119 Opinion BIDS [2008] paragraph 51. 
120 Ibid, paragraph 52 – 54. 
121 See Wetter and others, page 169. 
122 Wahl, page 27. 
123 European Night Services [1998] paragraph 137. 
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The GC held that the hypothesis put forward by the Commission was 
‘unsupported by any evidence or analysis of the structure of the relevant 
market from which it might be concluded that it represented a real, concrete 
possibility.’124. The Court further found that the claim that third parties were 
restricted was unsubstantiated and held that the contested decision was 
vitiated by insufficiency of reasoning.125  
 
In the preparatory work to the SCA the Government pointed out that it is not 
necessary that there is competition on the market when the agreement is 
concluded. Instead, it is sufficient that competition could occur but that the 
possibility for it to do so is restricted by the agreement.126 In this 
connection, the MC has in several cases stated that the parties to the 
agreement would not have been competitors in a counter-factual scenario 
where the agreement was not concluded.127  
 
In Cementa128 the MC stated that undertakings are not prohibited from 
cooperating in tendering processes, when it is clear that they would not be 
able to submit tenders individually without the cooperation.129 The Court 
held that the ability to submit individual tenders could not be assessed only 
by determining whether or not the undertakings had the capacity needed to 
supply the project. Instead, the assessment should take into account the 
consequences of an individual tender for the undertakings. Considering, 
inter alia, the ordinary customers already supplied by the undertakings, the 
MC held that the possibility to individually submit tenders was practically 
excluded. Hence, the agreement was not considered to restrict 
competition.130 Wahl notes that this case may be viewed an example on 
situations where there is no restriction of competition at all.131 
 
Furthermore, in Swerock132 the MC considered whether two undertakings 
conducting quarry operations in a joint venture restricted competition to an 
appreciable extent. The Court noted that one of the parties did not have a 
quarry operation on its own and that it was highly unlikely that it would get 
the permits necessary. Hence, breaking up the joint venture would lead to 
fewer undertakings operating on the relevant market. The Court therefore 
found that the cooperation between the undertakings did not appreciably 
restrict competition.133  
 
  
                                                
124 European Night Services [1998] paragraph 142. 
125 Ibid, paragraph 154 and 160. 
126 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 72f. 
127 Cementa [1997], Swerock [2001]. 
128 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1997:15 (Swed.) Competition Authority v 
Cementa AB and others. 
129 Cementa [1997] page 7. 
130 Ibid, page 7. 
131 Wahl, page 18. 
132 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2001:11 (Swed.) Swerock and others v 
Competition Authority. 
133 Swerock [2001] page 15f.  
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In conclusion, it is necessary that there could be competition between the 
parties or third parties that may be restricted by the relevant agreement. The 
assessment should not only consider the ability, such as the capacity to 
supply certain products, in absolute terms. Instead, it is necessary to also 
consider the context and take into account the consequences of the 
individual undertakings. Hence, assuming that it has been determined that 
the parties to an agreement would not be able to compete in the absence of 
the agreement, or that it could affect third parties ability to compete, there is 
no restriction of competition. Therefore, the conduct should be considered 
to fall outside the scope of the prohibition for the reason that it does not 
negatively effect competition, not because the effects are insignificant in 
qualitative terms and therefore do not constitute an appreciable restriction.   
 
4.2.4.2 Ancillary Restraints  
In EU case law it has been stated that an agreement may not escape the 
prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU because it serves other purposes, in 
addition to the restrictive object, which may be legitimate.134 However, 
there has evolved a doctrine of ‘ancillary restraints’ in the EU case law, 
which state that restrictions that are necessary and proportionate in relation 
to a main operation with a desirable or legitimate object are not prohibited 
under Art. 101(1) TFEU.135 In this context Ortis points out that an 
agreement may escape the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU when it appears 
to restrict competition, but in fact does not. This has been referred to as the 
European rule of reason.136 Although, as noted in section 4.2.5, a European 
rule of reason within Art. 101(1) TFEU has been rejected by the EU courts.  
 
In the case MasterCard137 the GC noted that the applicants’ reference to the 
objective necessity of the agreement must be understood as meaning that it 
was an ancillary restriction to the main operation, or primary objective, of 
the applicant. The Court stated that a restriction must be objectively 
necessary and proportionate. The Court further rejected that the argument by 
the applicant that determining if the agreement was objectively necessary 
involved balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the 
agreement. On the contrary, the assessment was considered relatively 
abstract and was not aimed at analysing if the restriction was indispensible 
for commercial success but instead if it, in the context of the main operation, 
was necessary to implement the main operation.138 AG Trstenjak stated in 
her opinion in the case BIDS that Art. 101(1) TFEU considers whether an 
agreement directly affects consumer welfare by restricting competition.  
  
                                                
134 BIDS [2008] paragraphs 22 – 25. 
135 MasterCard [2012] paragraph 80. 
136 Ortiz, page 41f. 
137 Case T-111/08 MasterCard v European Commission [2012] (Not yet officially 
published), available at: <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/the-opinion-of-
the-european-general-court-2/>. 
138 Ibid, paragraph 80. 
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Art. 101(3) TFEU on the other hand considers whether restrictive 
agreements may provide indirect benefits for consumer welfare, in particular 
through a reduction in production costs. Hence, factors such as efficiencies 
in production as a result of economies of scale may not be taken into 
account in the context of Art. 101(1) TFEU.139 In the preliminary ruling 
Pierre Fabre140 the CJEU stated that selective distribution agreements 
necessarily affect competition in the common market and that ‘such 
agreements are to be considered, in the absence of objective justification, as 
‘restrictions by object’.’141  Bailey notes that  
 
Perhaps the Court in Pierre Fabre was considering whether 
certain types of prima facie restrictive conduct fall outside 
Article 101(1), as opposed to whether a restriction by object can 
be saved by a legitimate objective under Article 101(1): a subtle, 
but important, difference.142  
 
The distinction may be compared to the distinction made initially in the 
previous section, that certain agreements may be considered to fall outside 
the scope of the restriction of competition condition. Hence, there is no 
balancing of the different pro or anti-competitive objectives in the Art. 
101(1) TFEU assessment. 
 
Ortiz notes that restrictions have generally been considered ancillary when 
the objectives pursued by an agreement are recognised as desirable, either 
by a legitimate protectable objective or if it is economically advantageous, 
and the restriction is indispensible. Hence, the agreement escapes the 
prohibition if it is the least restrictive alternative in order to achieve a 
desirable objective.143 A similar view has been expressed by Wahl who 
notes that ancillary restraints may be viewed as certain operations receiving 
a protection for their proper function.144 There have been Swedish cases 
indicating that agreements, which serve a desirable objective, may escape 
the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA. In Svenska Bilsportförbundet145 the MC 
stated that an agreement or decision by an association of undertakings, that 
restricts one or more of the undertakings freedom of action and thereby 
restricts competition, may escape the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA.146  
  
                                                
139 Opinion BIDS [2008] paragraph 55 - 56 . 
140 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la 
concurrence and Ministre de l’Économie, de l’Industrie et de l’Emploi  [2011] E.C.R. Page 
00000. 
141 Ibid, paragraph 39. 
142 Bailey, page 11. 
143 Ortiz, page 41f., See also Bailey, page 11, who notes that the Court’s use of ‘objective 
justification’ in Pierre Fabre perhaps should be seen as considering whether certain prima 
facie restrictive conduct fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, as opposed to a 
restriction by object being saved by a legitimate objective. 
144 Wahl, page 10. 
145 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2012:16 (Swed.) Svenska Bilsportförbundet v 
Competition Authority. 
146 Svenska Bilsportförbundet [2012] paragraph 140. 
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The Court stated, with a reference to the case Meca-Medina and Mejcen v 
Commission147,  
 
[…] An assessment must be conducted considering partly the 
overall context, in which the decision was made, and the 
purposes of the decision, partly whether the relevant restriction 
of competition is inherent in the pursuit of those purposes, and 
partly if the purposes may be attained through less far-reaching 
measures.148 
 
The MC found that the contested provision restricted competition to an 
appreciable extent and could not be justified through the pleaded legitimate 
purposes.149 The case above concerned conduct that was considered to have 
the effect, not the object, to restrict competition. However, in Bil-Bengtsson 
and others150, concerning alleged price fixing and market sharing, the 
applicants argued, inter alia, that the cooperation had legitimate reasons to 
coordinate their conduct. They argued that the agreement was necessary in 
order to increase their negotiation power towards the common producer 
VPS, to reduce the free rider problem and consequently reduce consumer 
prices. The MC confirmed that there could be legitimate reasons for the 
undertakings to cooperate in relation to their common general agent VPS. 
However, the Court continued, the alleged restriction of competition 
concerned fixing prices and rebates in relation to end consumers. The 
applicants had failed to show that the agreement was necessary or harmless 
from a consumer perspective.151  
 
In conclusion, it seems as though the MC has embraced the doctrine of 
ancillary restraints and that certain limitations do not restrict competition 
because the parties lack the ability to compete in absence of cooperation. 
These categories of agreements could be organized as escaping the 
prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA or Art. 101(1) TFEU due to their qualitative 
insignificance. However, I find it more compelling to consider these 
agreements not satisfying the restriction of competition condition. From the 
case law it appears as though the MC does not consider the total capacity of 
the undertaking in the assessment of its ability to compete.  
  
                                                
147 Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European 
Communities [2006] I-06991, in particular paragraph 42. 
148 Svenska Bilsportförbundet [2012] paragraph 140 (author’s translation). 
149 Ibid, paragraph 154. 
150 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2008:12 (Swed.) Competition Authority v Bil-
Bengtsson and others. 
151 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 12f., See also NCC and others [2009] page 49, 
where the MC stated that the applicants agreements and concerted practices had as their 
object the restriction of competition. Furthermore, the Court stated that no objectively 
justifying reason had been shown as to why competing undertakings should be in contact 
with each other prior to the submission of tenders, . Similarly, in Västerbottens Taxi [2000] 
page 8, the MC stated that the cooperation could not be considered necessary in order to 
participate in tendering concerning hospital transports. Furthermore, the cooperation could 
not be considered to enhance competition as claimed by the applicants. 
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Instead, the Court considers the actual context of the agreement, and what 
the consequences would be for the undertakings if they would have 
competed individually. The case law of the MC in relation to ancillary 
restraints is limited and experiences from the EU courts may provide 
guidance. The analysis of ancillary restraints consist of three steps: 
 
1. The Court make an abstract assessment of the purpose of the 
agreement in order to determine whether the main operation may be 
considered fundamentally beneficial or desirable for society and 
consumers. The assessment is based on direct effects on competition 
and is not concerned with indirect effect, such as might follow from 
a reduction of production costs. 
2. If the main operation is considered desirable, the Court focus on the 
restriction and whether it may be considered necessary or inherent 
in the pursuit of the purposes.   
3. Lastly, the Court consider whether the restriction is proportionate in 
relation to the purpose, or if the purpose may be achieved through 
less restrictive means. 
 
 34 
5 Market Definition and Market 
Power 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In chapter 3 the brief overview of some of the economic reasoning 
underlying the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements showed that 
inefficiencies might arise when undertaking are capable of setting prices or 
output independently of its competitors, in other words when they enjoy 
market power. In order to determine whether an undertaking may act 
independently of its competitors it may be necessary to define the relevant 
market, and thereby identify which undertakings do constrain the actions of 
the undertakings.152 Carl Wetter and others note that in order to apply the 
competition rules it is necessary that the undertakings may influence the 
market. Furthermore, they point out that an appropriate definition of the 
relevant market, providing a foundation for determining the market shares 
of the undertakings, is generally a prerequisite to determine the market 
influence.153  
 
The Commission notes in this connection that an appropriately defined 
market could be seen as ‘a tool to identify and define the boundaries of 
competition between firms’.154 It seeks to identify the competitive 
constraints an undertaking faces from other undertakings on the market. 
Defining the market makes it possible to calculate market shares, which 
provides a very useful indication on market power.155 The following 
sections will consider the rigorous case law that has evolved in EU case law 
concerning the scope of the obligation to conduct a market analysis. 
Subsequently, the Swedish approach taken in case law to define the scope of 
the same obligation will be examined in light of the EU case law. 
  
                                                
152 Notice on the relevant market, paragraph 2. 
153 Wetter and others, page 105. 
154 Notice on the relevant market, paragraph 2. 
155 Ibid, paragraph 2. 
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5.2 Defining the Relevant Market in Art. 
101(1) TFEU 
5.2.1 Introduction 
It should initially be point out that the burden of proof of proving an 
infringement of Art. 101(1) TFEU is on the competition authority or private 
party alleging the infringement. However, the party claiming the benefit of 
Art. 101(3) bear the burden of proof to show that the conditions of that 
paragraph are fulfilled.156 Consequently the Commission must provide the 
proof necessary to satisfy the conditions when it brings an action in relation 
to Art. 101(1) TFEU. In order to satisfy these conditions, it is often, as noted 
in the introduction, necessary to define the relevant market. The relevant 
market is established by the combination of the relevant product and 
geographic market. According to the Commission notice on the relevant 
market157, the relevant product market comprises,  
 
All those products and/or services which are regarded as 
interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of 
the products’ characteristics, their prices and their intended 
use.158  
 
The geographic market comprises, according to the same notice, 
 
[…] the area which the undertakings concerned are involved in 
the supply and demand of products or services, in which the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and 
which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the 
conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
area.159  
 
The relevant market is defined in the application of Article 101(1), 101(3), 
102 TFEU and the Merger Regulation. The Commission points out that the 
criteria for defining the relevant market should be applied generally but may 
lead to different results depending on, inter alia, whether the analysis is 
concerned with structural changes of supply (i.e. concentrations) or past 
behaviour (i.e. Article 101 and 102 behaviour).160 In this connection Ortiz 
points out that there should not be any differences in the substantive content 
of the analysis, although it may vary in depth and sophistication.161  
                                                
156 Regulation 1/2003, Article 2. 
157 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, paragraph 5–13. 
158 Ibid, Paragraph 7. 
159 Ibid, Paragraph 8. 
160 Ibid, paragraph 10-12, See also Ortiz, page 4. 
161 Ortiz, page 4, See also Notice on the relevant market, paragraph 10-11. 
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In its analysis the Commission will usually, based on preliminary 
information available or submitted information, be able to broadly 
determine the relevant markets. This normally includes establishing a few 
alternative possible relevant markets. If these broadly defined alternative 
markets do not amount to any competitive harm, the market must not be 
more precisely defined.162 
5.2.2 Market Definition as a Necessary 
Precondition 
It was stated early on in the case law of the EU courts that in order to 
analyse a potentially anti-competitive agreement it is first necessary to 
define the relevant market. In Società Italiana Vetro163 the Court stated, 
rejecting the argument that a definition of the market would be superfluous 
because of the unambiguous and explicit evidence of the agreements, that 
‘[…] the appropriate definition of the market in question is a necessary 
precondition of any judgement concerning allegedly anti-competitive 
behaviour’.164 The Court further held that the Commission, even though it is 
not required to reply to all arguments put forward by the applicants, should 
have examined the market structure in order to show that the applicants 
conclusions where groundless.165 Similarly, the definition of the relevant 
market has been considered, in legal doctrine, as an indispensible 
prerequisite for determining whether an appreciable reduction in 
competition has occurred within the application of Art. 101(1) TFEU.166 
 
In the 1990s and early 2000s the EU courts had to consider several 
arguments from various applicants relating to both the absence of a market 
definition and submissions that the market definition was incomplete or 
incorrect. In SPO167 the applicants, relying on the judgement in Società 
Italiana Vetro , stated that the Commission had failed to define the relevant 
market.168 In an attempt to determine the scope of the Commission’s 
obligation to define the relevant market, the GC stated that a proper 
definition of a relevant market is a necessary precondition in the application 
of Art. 102 TFEU. However, for the purpose of applying Art. 101 TFEU the 
market is defined in order to determine whether an agreement is liable to 
affect trade or restrict competition. It must therefore be seen in connection 
with these two conditions.169  
                                                
162 Notice on the relevant market, paragraph 26-27. 
163 Joined cases T-68/89, T-77/89 and T-78/89 Società Italiana Vetro SpA, Fabbrica Pisana 
SpA and PPG Vernante Pennitalia SpA v Commission of the European Communities [1992] 
E.C.R. II-01403. 
164 Ibid, paragraph 159, See also SPO [1995] paragraph 74. 
165 Ibid, paragraph 159. 
166 Ortiz, page 2. 
167 Case T-29/92 Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende Organisaties in de 
Bouwnijverheid and others v Commission of the European Communities [1995] E.C.R. II-
00289. 
168 Ibid, paragraph 66. 
169 Ibid, paragraph 73-75. 
 37 
Considering, inter alia, that the Commission had followed the approach 
taken by the applicants when defining the market, the Court found that the 
Commission was right to adopt the Netherlands building market as the 
relevant market.170 The judgement narrowed the scope of the Commission’s 
obligation to define the relevant market, as it was previously stated in 
Società Italiana Vetro , in relation to Art. 101 TFEU.  
 
5.2.3 Market Definition in Cases of Obvious 
Restrictions 
In European Night Services the applicants argued in favour of a rule of 
reason in the application of Art. 101(1) TFEU. They held that if the pro-
competitive effects outweigh the anti-competitive effects, and the latter were 
necessary, the agreement could not be considered an infringement of Art. 
101(1) TFEU. The Commission challenged the rule of reason argument and 
that the competitive benefits and harms should be balanced in the 
assessment of Art. 101(1) TFEU.171 The GC pointed out that, 
 
[…] it must be borne in mind that in assessing an agreement 
under Article 85(1) of the Treaty, account should be taken of the 
actual conditions in which it functions, in particular the 
economic context in which the undertakings operate, the 
products or services covered by the agreement and the actual 
structure of the market concerned […] unless it is an agreement 
containing obvious restrictions of competition such as price-
fixing, market-sharing or the control of outlets (Case T-148/89 
Tréfilunion ν Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, paragraph 109). 
In the latter case, such restrictions may be weighed against their 
claimed pro- competitive effects only in the context of Article 
85(3) of the Treaty, with a view to granting an exemption from 
the prohibition in Article 85(1).172 
 
The statement by the Court should be interpreted in the light of the 
discussion on the application of a rule of reason. The use of ‘obvious 
restrictions of competition’ may follow from the referred case law 
Tréfilunion173 where the CFI rejected a rule of reason in relation to ‘clear’ 
infringements.174 The statement in European Night Services was a response 
to an argument concerning the division of pro- and anti-competitive effects 
within Art. 101(1) TFEU, as noted in the last sentence of the quote.  
                                                
170 Ibid, paragraph, 76-83. 
171 European Night Services [1998] paragraph 130. 
172 Ibid, paragraph 136. 
173 Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion SA v Commission of the European Communities  [1995] 
E.C.R. II-01063. 
174 Ibid, paragraph 109, See also Montedipe [1992] paragraph 265, The use of a rule of 
reason in the application of Article 101(1) TFEU has also been rejected by the Commission, 
White Paper on Modernisation, paragraphs 31-32. 
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It should not be seen as rejecting the necessity of the appreciability 
condition, which does not consider pro-competitive effects but the 
magnitude of the actual, potential or presumed effects. In this connection, 
AG Trstenjak stated in BIDS,  
 
In so far as the Court of First Instance held in that judgment 
[European Night Services] that in the case of obvious 
restrictions such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of 
outlets there is no need to examine the legal and economic 
context, this merely shows that consideration of the legal and 
economic context may be summary.175  
 
I find it reasonable to assume that an agreement should not be assessed in a 
total vacuum from the context, even though the agreement has as its object 
the restriction of competition. Instead, in the case of obvious restrictions of 
competition it is only necessary to define the market summarily or in broad 
terms, leaving the precise market definition open.176 The following two 
cases suggest that the approaches taken by the EU courts are not entirely 
consistent as to whether, and in which cases, the economic and legal context 
should be considered.  
 
In the case Mannesmannröhren-Werke177, the GC reaffirmed the statement 
in European Night Services and continued by stating that it was not 
necessary to define the relevant geographic market, if the object was to 
share markets, provided that the competition on the territories concerned 
was necessarily restricted.178 Hence, the Court held that even assuming that 
the Commission defined the market insufficiently or incorrectly would not 
have an impact on the existence of the infringement. The use of ‘necessarily 
restricted’ can be compared with the statement in European Night Services 
making reference to ‘obvious restriction of competition’. It is possible that 
‘necessarily restricted’ imply a greater amount of certainty. The Court in 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke did not however exclude the definition of the 
geographic market, but states that it must not be defined with the same 
precision as would otherwise be necessary.  
 
On the other hand, the CJEU stated in its preliminary ruling in 
Lubricantes179 that even though the price fixing towards the public was 
explicitly prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, it still fell outside of the scope 
of the prohibition if it, inter alia, did not have appreciable effects on 
competition.180  
 
                                                
175 Opinion BIDS [2008] paragraph 47. 
176 Compare with the approach taken by the Commission, as explained in section 5.2.1. 
177 Case T-44/00 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission of the European 
Communities [2004] E.C.R. II-02223. 
178 Ibid, paragraph 132. 
179 Case C-506/07 Lubricantes y Carburantes Galaicos SL v GALP Energía España SAU 
[2009] E.C.R I-00134. 
180 Ibid, paragraph 55. 
 39 
The Court held that it is for the national court to determine whether the 
conditions of the prohibition was satisfied taking into account, in particular, 
the economic and legal context.181 The Court further reiterated in large parts 
the list of considerations that the Court in European Night Services found 
necessary to take into account in other cases than obvious restrictions of 
competition. The list included taking into account the nature of the goods 
and services provided, the operating conditions and structure of the market. 
 
Both cases indicate that circumstances in an individual case may make it 
obvious that an agreement restrict competition appreciably, rendering a 
precise definition of the market superfluous. The judgement in Lubricantes 
shows that it is not sufficient to only refer to the nature of the agreement in 
order to establish that a restriction of competition is obvious.  
 
This point was further stated in the more recent case Expedia, where the 
court put forward a similar list of considerations in order to establish that a 
restriction by object or effect perceptibly restrict competition.182 The Court 
stated, 
 
[…] the existence of such a restriction must be assessed by 
reference to the actual circumstances of such an agreement […]. 
Regard must be had, inter alia, to the content of its provisions, 
the objectives it seeks to attain and the economic and legal 
context of which it forms a part […]. It is also appropriate to 
take into consideration the nature of the goods or services 
affected, as well as the real conditions of the functioning and the 
structure of the market or markets in question […].183 
 
5.2.4 Market Definition as a Tool to Find 
Restrictions of Competition 
Prior to the judgements in SPO and European Night Services, the 
Commission had generally described the market in a general manner, not 
assessing the market power of the parties or their competitors. However, 
following these judgements the Commission took a more rigorous approach 
examining the market.184 In Volkswagen185 the GC reaffirmed the statement 
in SPO and added that there is, consequently, an obligation for the 
Commission to define the relevant market,  
 
                                                
181 Ibid, paragraph 28 and 55. 
182 Expedia [2012] paragraph 20 – 21. 
183 Ibid paragraph 21., See also Lubricantes [2009] paragraph 28, where a very similar 
statement was put forward by the CJEU in relation to agreements that fix prices or provide 
exclusive purchasing obligations on the parties.  
184 Ortiz, page 7. 
185 Case T-62/98 Volkswagen AG v Commission of the European Communities [2000] 
E.C.R. II-02707. 
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Where it is impossible, without such a definition, to determine 
whether the agreement […] has as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
common market.186 
 
The Court noted that the Commission had considered that the object of the 
infringement was to restrict competition. Furthermore, it held that the 
applicants had partitioned the Italian market, which could effect transactions 
between Italy and all other Member States. Consequently, the Court found 
that the application of Art. 101(1) TFEU did not require that the geographic 
market was defined.187 However, the Commission had in its decision noted 
that Volkswagen had the highest market share of any motor vehicle 
manufacturer in the Community.188 
 
The statement in Volkswagen was repeated in CMA CGM189, where the GC 
further held that it was up to the Court to determine whether the 
Commission, without defining the relevant market, could find that the 
agreement had appreciably restricted competition and was liable to affect 
trade between Member States.190 The Court noted that the horizontal price-
fixing agreement was a clear infringement of competition law, that the 
relevant charges and surcharges could constitute as much as 60 % of the 
total tariff in question and that the applicants controlled approximately 86 % 
of all scheduled eastbound liner traffic between northern Europe and the Far 
East.191 These circumstances allowed the Court to state that the Commission 
was entitled to find that the agreement had as its object an appreciable 
restriction of competition in relation to the related services as well.192 The 
case shows that when the relevant market has not been defined, the Court 
determine whether the analysis of the market, considering the circumstances 
relevant for the case, is sufficient to allow the Court to find an appreciable 
restriction of competition. In CMA CGM the GC took into account the 
nature of the agreement as well as qualitative factors (the significance of the 
surcharges) and quantitative factors (the position and importance of the 
parties). 
 
                                                
186 Ibid, paragraph 230, See also Ziegler [2011] Paragraph 45 – 46. 
187 Ibid, paragraph 131. 
188 Ibid, paragraph 29. 
189 Case T-213/00 CMA CGM and Others v Commission of the European Communities 
[2003] E.C.R. II-00913. 
190 Ibid, paragraph 208. 
191 Ibid, paragraph 209-212. 
192 Ibid, paragraph 213. 
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5.2.5 The Essential Requirement of Legal 
Certainty 
In the case Adriatica193 the applicant argued, inter alia, that the market 
definition made by the Commission was incorrect and incomplete, ignoring 
the differences between the routes, operators and services provided. The 
Commission disputed the merits of the applicants claim.194 The Court held 
that the Commission rightly concluded that the conditions in Art. 101(1) 
TFEU were satisfied and that the agreement in question had distorted 
competition. However, the Court continued by stating that  
 
[…] the Commission ought to examine the relevant market or 
markets and identify them in the statement of reasons which it 
gives for any decision sanctioning an infringement of Article 
85(1) of the Treaty, and it should do so with sufficient precision 
so as to be able to identify the operating conditions in the market 
in which competition has been distorted and to satisfy the 
essential requirements of legal certainty.195  
 
The Court found that it was desirable that a decision by the Commission 
relating to a complex, collective and continuous infringement should take 
into account that personal liability is limited to the particular involvement of 
each undertaking.196 The Court further restated the judgement in Società 
Italiana Vetro  and referred to Völk197, stating that a market analysis is not 
superfluous where the documentary evidence of a cartel is clear and explicit, 
but instead is a necessary precondition for any judgement as to allegedly 
anti-competitive behaviour.198  
 
The judgement in Adriatica led the Commission, in its Industrial bags 
decision199, to find that,  
 
[…] defining the market in a cartel case does not call for a 
degree of precision equal to that which is required when 
assessing infringements of Article 82 of the Treaty or in certain 
merger cases. It is merely the case that the product concerned 
must be sufficiently well defined to enable each undertaking 
involved to be correctly allotted its share of responsibility for 
the Commission of the infringement, especially where the 
infringement is a collective, continuous one.200 
                                                
193 Case T-61/99 Adriatica di Navigazione SpA v Commission of the European 
Communities [2003] E.C.R. II-05349. 
194 Ibid, paragraph 14 and 19. 
195 Ibid, paragraph 32. 
196 Ibid, paragraph 32. 
197 Case 5/69 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke [1969] E.C.R. 00295. 
198 Adriatica [2004] paragraph 33. 
199 Case COMP/38354 Industrial Bags C(2005)4634, 30.XI.2005, Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38354/38354_527_4.pdf> 
(referred to as ‘Industrial Bags Decision [2005]’). 
200 Industrial Bags Decision [2005] paragraph 27. 
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However, in light of the case law described above it is not the author’s view 
that this statement is true. Although the degree of precision is not equal to 
the assessment of infringements of Art. 102 TFEU, the market analysis must 
be sufficiently deep and sophisticated to find, 1) that the conditions for the 
application of Art. 101(1) TFEU has been satisfied, and 2) that the essential 
requirements of legal certainty, such as the principle of personal 
responsibility for collective infringements has been satisfied. It is necessary 
to satisfy both of the conditions mentioned above. 
 
5.2.6 The Substance of the Analysis 
The above-mentioned case law has focused on the depth and sophistication 
of the market definition. The previous sections has, inter alia, found that a 
market analysis is necessary to the extent that it is possible to establish that 
the conditions in Art. 101(1) TFEU have been satisfied. Moreover, it shows 
that the market analysis must not be as precise when the case concerns 
obvious restrictions of competition. However, there is some uncertainty as 
to what constitutes an obvious restriction of competition. As noted in 
section 5.2.3, the assessment should not merely assess the nature of the 
agreement but also consider the circumstances in which it functions.  
This section suggests what a more summary market analysis of the 
economic and legal context should contain in order to establish that a 
restriction of competition is obvious. The analysis can be compared to the 
broad establishment of the possible relevant markets, as put forward by the 
Commission, and whether this broad assessment render the restriction of 
competition obvious.201  
 
Guidance as to the content of this more summary analysis, to find an 
obvious restriction of competition, may perhaps be inferred from the 
guidelines on the effect on trade202 and case law concerning appreciable 
effect on trade203. Paragraph 53 of the guideline provides, inter alia, that 
agreements, which by their very nature are capable of affecting trade 
between Member States, often may be presumed to be appreciable when the 
market share of the parties exceeds 5 %. This presumption, based on the 5 
% threshold, can be traced back to the case Miller.204  
 
In Gosselin Group205 the GC generally stated that Art. 101(1) TFEU is not 
applicable when the effect of an agreement on competition or trade is not 
appreciable.206  
                                                
201 Notice on the relevant market, paragraph 26-27. 
202 Guidelines on effect on trade. 
203 Gosselin Group [2011] paragraph 3. 
204 Faull & Nikpay, page 283, paragraph 3.371, See Miller [1978]. 
205 Joined cases T-208/08 and T-209/08 Gosselin Group NV (T-208/08) and Stichting 
Administratiekantoor Portielje (T-209/08) v European Commission [2011] E.C.R II-03639. 
206 Ibid, paragraph 90. 
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In its response to the alleged absence of appreciable effect on trade the 
Court held that the Commission had theoretically failed to provide a market 
analysis necessary to show that the 5 % market share was reached.207 
However, the Court continued by stating that the Commission had, ‘[…] in 
the circumstances of the case […] nevertheless, established to the requisite 
legal standard that the second alternative condition provided for in the 
presumption laid down in point 53 of the 2004 Guidelines was met’208  In 
conclusion, the Court held that where the following conditions were met the 
Commission did not have to determine the relevant market and calculate the 
market shares of the parties: 
 
Where the Commission provides a sufficiently detailed 
description of the sector concerned, including supply, demand 
and geographic scope, it identifies the relevant services and 
market precisely and such a description of the sector can be 
sufficient, in so far as it is sufficiently detailed, to enable the 
Court to verify the Commission’s basic assertions and in so far 
as, on that basis, it is clear that the combined market share far 
exceeds the 5% threshold.209 
 
The case CMA CGM could be used as an example on of a case where the 
GC were able to find that the agreement restricted competition to an 
appreciable extent without defining the market. The Court looked at the 
nature of the agreement, the scope of the restriction and the position of the 
parties in order to find that the conditions in Art. 101(1) TFEU had been 
satisfied.210 
 
Consequently, where it is possible, based on the above-mentioned 
conditions, to establish that an agreement is an obvious restriction of 
competition, due to the circumstances in an individual case, it may not be 
necessary to conduct a deeper and more sophisticated analysis of the 
relevant market and the market share of the parties in order to establish an 
infringement of the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
  
                                                
207 Ibid, paragraph 110. 
208 Ibid, paragraph 3 and 111. 
209 Ibid, paragraph 3. 
210 CMA CGM [2003] paragraph 209-212. 
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5.3 Defining the Relevant Market in 2 ch. 1 
§ SCA 
5.3.1 Introduction 
It is obvious from Swedish case law that the Competition Authority has the 
evidentiary burden to prove that 2 ch. 1 § SCA has been infringed. In 
Asstistanskåren and others211 the Court stated that when the Competition 
Authority brings an action for administrative fines it must provide an 
investigation that clearly shows that the Competition Act has been infringed. 
The burden of proof was held to be on the Competition Authority and that 
the level of proof necessary, to prove the infringement, was relatively 
high.212  
 
It was indicated already in the preparatory works of the SCA that the depth 
and sophistication of the appreciability analysis depends on the nature of the 
agreement. The Government stated that even though a restrictive object has 
been established, it is still necessary to assess if the influence on 
competition is appreciable. Although, the assessment may be done in a less 
in depth manner when a restrictive object has been established, leaving a 
more thorough analysis of the effects for the assessment of an exemption.213 
Similarly, the necessity to define the relevant market in cases of restrictions 
by object was pointed out in VIVO214 where the MC found that it is 
necessary to define the relevant market even in cases of horizontal price 
fixing.215 In order to get a better understanding on how the obligation to 
define the relevant market has evolved it is necessary to examine the case 
law as it has evolved in the Swedish courts. 
 
5.3.2 Market Definition as a Tool to Find 
Restrictions of Competition 
 
In NCC and others216, concerning alleged price fixing and market sharing, 
the MC stated that in order to find an infringement of the prohibition in 2 
ch. 1 § SCA an agreement has to restrict competition to an appreciable 
extent. In order to find an appreciable restriction the parties’ positions on the 
relevant market must be considered.217  
                                                
211 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2007:23 (Swed.) Competition Authority v 
Assistancekåren Sweden AB and others. 
212 Ibid, page 3f.  
213 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 72f. 
214 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1997:11 (Swed.) VIVO v the Swedish 
Competition Authority. 
215 Ibid, page 7. 
216 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2009:11 (Swed.) NCC and others v 
Competition Authority. 
217 Ibid, page 49. 
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Hence, it may be inferred from the statement that an analysis of the market 
is necessary in order to consider the position of the parties. 
 
In the recent case Svenska Bilsportförbundet the MC stated that the relevant 
market is defined in order to determine the market power of the undertaking. 
The Court further held, in line with the case law as evolved in the EU 
courts, ‘In a case concerning alleged restrictions of competition a market 
definition is done primarily in order to determine whether the restriction is 
appreciable’218 The statement shows that the depth and sophistication of the 
market analysis depends on the circumstances in the case. Furthermore, the 
analysis does not have to go further than to allow the courts to establish that 
an agreement appreciably restrict competition. It seems reasonable therefore 
to argue that it is not necessary to provide a more precise definition of the 
market then to allow the court to find that the conditions in 2 ch. 1 § SCA 
are satisfied. Hence, in light of the EU case law, once it is obvious that an 
agreement appreciably restrict competition it is not necessary to further 
consider the context of the agreement. The veracity of this argument is 
further evidenced by the reasoning of the courts in case law as presented in 
the following sections. 
 
5.3.3 An Appreciable Restriction Regardless of 
a Precise Definition 
The MC has in many cases held that it is possible to find an appreciable 
restriction of competition regardless of the exact definition of the relevant 
market. In several cases the Court has stated that the exact definition would 
be unnecessary, in particular due to the serious nature of the restriction.219 In 
Bil-Bengtsson and others the parties disputed the definition of the relevant 
market. The Swedish Competition Authority (CA, Swed. Konkurrensverket) 
argued that the geographic market was the provinces of Skåne, Blekinge and 
Kronoberg.  
The parties, on the other hand, argued that the geographic market was 
considerably larger. The MC found that the definition of the geographic 
market put forward by the Compeition Authority was reasonable. In the 
provinces of Skåne and Blekinge the market share of the parties was 23 and 
19 %, in the two relevant product markets. The Court further noted that it 
was necessarily slightly lower adding the province of Kronoberg and 
eventually some other area.220  
  
                                                
218 Svenska bilsportförbundet [2012] page 17 (Author’s translation). 
219 NCC and others [2009] page 50, Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 16, Uponor 
[2003], page 4f., VVS-installatörerna [2005], page 11. 
220 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 16ff. 
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Although, the Court held,  
 
Regardless of the exact definition of the market, it is obvious 
that the market shares in relation to new as well as used cars far 
exceeds the threshold where it may be put into question whether 
horizontal price fixing and market sharing appreciably restricts 
competition.221 
 
The Court indicated with its judgement that there is a threshold below which 
a deeper and more sophisticated analysis of the appreciability condition may 
be necessary. The facts of the case allowed the Court to find an appreciable 
restriction regardless of the precise definition of the relevant market.  
 
In Uponor222 the MC pointed out that the parties had differing opinions as to 
the aggregate market share of the parties cooperation in question (between 
30 – 40 %). The Court stated, similar to the case in Bil-Bengtsson and 
others, ‘Regardless, it can be stated that the aggregate market share of the 
undertakings is sufficient for the agreement to be found to appreciably 
restrict competition on this basis alone’223  
 
It seems as though the MC has taken a similar approach as the EU courts 
stating that it is necessary to consider the market power of the parties to an 
alleged restriction of competition. Furthermore, the analysis depth and 
sophistication vary depending on the circumstances of the case.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Defining the relevant market is often a necessary precondition in order to 
find an infringement of 2 ch. 1 § SCA and Art. 101(1) TFEU. However, the 
depth and sophistication of the analysis vary depending on the 
circumstances of the case. The analysis cannot be seen in isolation, but as a 
means to determine whether the conditions of 2 ch. 1 § SCA or Art. 101(1) 
TFEU have been satisfied.  
 
When it is possible to determine that an agreement is an obvious restriction 
of competition, without a closer examination of the market, it is not 
necessary to further define the relevant market. It could be argued that the 
statement by the Court in Bil-Bengtsson and others, as quoted above, should 
be viewed in light of the case law concerning obvious restrictions of 
competition.  
  
                                                
221 Ibid, page 16 (author’s translation). 
222 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 2003:2 (Swed.) Uponor v Competition 
Authority. 
223 Ibid, page 4f., Compare with VVS-installatörerna [2005] page 11, where the court found 
that the cooperation, regardless of whether the definition submitted by the applicant or 
Competition Authority was used, effected a ‘not insignificant part of the market’. 
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Consequently, when it is possible to establish that a threshold, not yet 
clarified by the Swedish courts, has been far exceeded, an agreement 
obviously restricts competition, which renders a deeper analysis of the 
market superfluous. Guidance as to what the more summary analysis should 
contain and what the relevant threshold should be may possibly be inferred 
from the case law of the EU courts, which will be further addressed in the 
final analysis in chapter 7. Finally, even though the conditions in 2 ch. 1 § 
and Art. 101(1) TFEU have been satisfied it may still be necessary, 
depending on the circumstances of the case in question, to define the 
relevant market in order to satisfy the essential requirements of legal 
certainty.  
 
5.5 Market Power 
As pointed out in chapter 3, market power is of central importance for the 
ability to negatively influence the relevant market. Furthermore, the market 
definition as examined in the previous sections of this chapter seeks to 
determine the market power of undertakings. Hence, it is necessary to define 
what market power is and how it may be measured. Eklöf points out that the 
control of market power is one of competition law’s real raisons d’être.224 
He further notes that market power is not an isolated condition in Art. 
101(1) TFEU; it is enough to show appreciable effect. However, Eklöf 
argues that it is highly doubtful that an appreciable effect should be viewed 
as something other than restrictive effects on competition in relation to 
identified market power.225 Bishop and Walker notes that one characteristic 
of markets with effective competition is the absence of market power.226 
The authors define market power as,  
 
The ability of a firm or group of firms to raise price, through the 
restriction of output, above the level that would prevail under 
competitive conditions and thereby to enjoy increased profits 
from the action.227  
 
In the guidelines on Article 81(3) the Commission provides guidance not 
only on the interpretation of Article 101(3), but also on the interpretation of 
the prohibition in Art. 101(1) TFEU. The guideline defines market power 
as,  
 
The ability to maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time or to maintain output in terms of 
product quantities, product quality and variety or innovation 
below competitive levels for a significant period of time.228  
                                                
224 Ekelöf, moderniseringen, page 261. 
225 Ibid, page 270. 
226 Bishop & Walker, page 52, paragraph 2-002. 
227 Ibid, page 52, paragraph 2-002. 
228 Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 25. 
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Anti-competitive effects are more likely to occur when the parties have or 
obtain market power and the agreement ‘contributes to the creation, 
maintenance or strengthening of that market power or allows the parties to 
exploit such market power.’229 Market power is, however, a question of 
degree, since undertakings in most markets are able to fix their prices higher 
than their marginal cost. It is therefore necessary to determine what level of 
market power is needed to result in anti-competitive effects.230 The 
preparatory works of the SCA, although not providing a clear definition of 
market power, notes that increased competition provides benefits for 
consumers through lower prices and increased output.231 
 
There is no absolute instrument for determining whether or not undertakings 
have market power. Bishop and Walker states that, assuming that firms will 
be profit maximizing, the ability to independently raise prices or lower 
output depends on the price elasticity on the demand of the individual firm 
under conditions of effective competition. In other words, a firm enjoys 
market power where an increase in price would not lead to a decrease in 
demand rendering the change in price unprofitable.232 Many factors may be 
considered in order to appreciate price elasticity and market power, such as 
the number of competing suppliers, concentration, barriers to entry and 
expansion, market shares and countervailing buyer power.233 However, 
market shares may be considered to be the primary tool used in order to 
assess market power used by competition authorities.234 This paper will not 
further analyse the assessment of market power or the measures used to 
conduct the assessment. 
                                                
229 Ibid, paragraph 25. 
230 Geradin and others, page 78f., paragraph 2.57 – 2.58. 
231 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 4. 
232 Bishop & Walker, page 53 - 56., paragraph 3-003-3.005 and page 62, paragraph 3-012. 
233 Ibid, page, 62 paragraph 3-012. 
234 Geradin and others, page 87, paragraph 2.84. 
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6 Appreciability 
6.1 Introduction 
As has been discussed in section 4, the restriction of competition condition 
is divided into object and effect restrictions. Agreements that restrict 
competition by object are presumed to be harmful and actual effects must 
therefore not be proven. This eases the investigatory or evidentiary burden 
of the party trying to prove an infringement of the prohibition laid down in 
Art. 101(1) TFEU and 2 ch. 1 § SCA. However, as shown in section 5.1 – 
5.3 it is still necessary to conduct a market analysis to the extent that it may 
be established that the conditions of the prohibition are satisfied, in 
particular the appreciability condition. This chapter examines the existence 
and scope of a safe harbour for object restrictions that are deemed not to 
have appreciable effects.   
 
The condition that a restriction of competition must be appreciable is not 
stated directly in Art.101 TFEU. However, the necessity to limit the scope 
of Art. 101 TFEU to agreements that restrict competition to an appreciable 
extent was recognised early in EU case law.235 With the introduction of the 
SCA, modelled after the EU competition rules, the appreciability condition 
was stated directly in 2 ch. 1 §. The exception is based on the principles de 
minimis non curat lex, and that certain conduct is too insignificant to 
consider for the law.236 
 
Different views have been expressed concerning whether or not the de 
minimis principle should be applied at all in relation to object restrictions. 
Section 6.1.1 will examine some of the arguments put forward where a more 
restrictive attitude has been held towards applying the de minimis principle 
in relation to object restrictions. The following section will consider the 
view that the de minimis should be applied in cases concerning restrictions 
by both effect and object. 
  
                                                
235 Völk [1969] paragraph 5 – 7. 
236 Opinion Miller [1978] page 4, See also Black’s Law Dictionary, page 496 ‘de minimis 
non curat lex – The law does not concern itself with trifles’, and  The free dictionary by 
Farlex, available at: <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/de+minimis+non+curat+lex> ‘The 
law does not concern itself with trifles; - a principle of law, that even if a technical violation 
of a law appears to exist according to the letter of the law, if the effect is too small to be of 
consequence, the violation of the law will not be considered as a sufficient cause of action, 
whether in civil or criminal proceedings.’ 
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6.1.1 De Minimis as Applicable Only in Effects 
Cases 
It has been argued, in relation to object restrictions, that the de minimis 
principle should not be applied at all due to the inherently harmful nature of 
this category of agreements. Geradin and others seem to argue that since the 
Commission de minimis notice expressly excludes certain hardcore 
restrictions, such as price fixing and market sharing, these agreements do 
not enjoy the benefit of the safe harbour the de minimis principle provides. 
The authors state that in practice the Commission has not pursued hardcore 
restrictions where the undertakings were of a small size and that ‘this 
probably explains the mistaken view that the de minimis doctrine also 
applies to restrictions by object’237. Moreover, in the recent case Expedia, 
AG Kokott expressed the view that agreements with anti-competitive object 
hardly can be regarded as de minimis infringements, considering their 
harmful nature. Kokott continued,  
 
[…] it must be presumed that undertakings which enter into an 
agreement with an anti-competitive object always intend an 
appreciable effect on competition, irrespective of the size of 
their market shares and turnover.238  
 
She argued that market share thresholds were intended to provide legal 
certainty and provide a safe harbour. However, this preferential treatment 
should not be afforded to agreements with anti-competitive object since it 
would practically invite undertakings to refrain from effective 
competition.239 
 
A restrictive approach in the application of the de minimis principle in 
relation to certain agreements may also be inferred from EU case law. In 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke the GC held,  
 
Undertakings which conclude an agreement whose purpose is to 
restrict competition cannot, in principle, avoid the application of 
Article 81(1) EC by claiming that their agreement should not 
have an appreciable effect on competition.240  
 
The GC held that the sole reason of existence for the agreement was to 
restrict competition appreciably. The Court further held that it was not, in 
principle, necessary to define the relevant market precisely, ‘provided that 
actual or potential competition on the territories concerned was necessarily 
restricted […]’.241 However, the approach taken by the GC should be 
viewed in light of the facts of the case.  
  
                                                
237 Geradin and others, page 141, paragraph 3.138. 
238 Opinion Expedia [2012] paragraph 50. 
239 Ibid, paragraph 52. 
240 Mannesmannröhren-Werke [2004] paragraph 130. 
241 Ibid, paragraph 132. 
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The applicants were parties to an agreement, which prohibited them from 
selling their products in the national markets of each other. Furthermore, the 
agreement covered products on four domestic markets, which amounted to 
about 15 % of the consumption on the internal market.242 Consequently, the 
agreement led to absolute observance of the national markets, and could be 
considered to be a ‘naked cartel’243, between parties with a very strong 
position on the market.  
 
In the Swedish context it does not seem to be an as strong debate on whether 
the de minimis principle applies to object as well as effect restrictions. This 
might be because 2 ch. 1 § SCA expressly states that an agreement is 
prohibited if its object or effect is to appreciably restrict competition. 
Furthermore, the preparatory work explicitly states that even though it is not 
necessary to show that an agreement has a negative influence on the market 
once it has been established that it has a restrictive object, it is still 
necessary to analyse whether the agreement effects the market 
appreciably.244 However, the view is often expressed that it is highly 
unlikely that certain types of agreements would be found not to be 
appreciable.245 The MC stated in Bil-Bengtsson and others that even though 
there is no prohibition per se in the Swedish competition rules, there is a 
strong presumption that price fixing and market sharing agreements restrict 
competition. 
 
6.1.2 De Minimis as Applicable in Both Object 
and Effects Cases 
Initially, it should be pointed out that the Commission de minimis notice is 
neither binding on the EU courts nor the courts of the Member States. This 
follows, in relation to the EU courts, from the wording of paragraph 6 of the 
notice stating that it is without prejudice to the interpretation of Art. 101(1) 
TFEU by the EU courts.246 Furthermore it follows, in relation to Member 
States, from the purpose of the notice, which is to make the application of 
Art. 101(1) TFEU by the Commission transparent. The Commission 
imposes a limitation on its discretion to interpret Art. 101(1) TFEU in 
accordance with the notice, since a departure would be inconsistent with the 
protection of legal certainty. Consequently, the notice is not binding in 
relation to Member States.247  
  
                                                
242 Seamless Steel Tubes Decision [1999] paragraph 101 – 106. 
243 Mario Monti defines naked cartels as follows, ‘they serve to restrict competition without 
producing any objective counterveiling benefits’, See Policy Conference on Fighting 
Cartels, page 15. 
244 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 72. 
245 Wetter and others, page 1165f., in particular footnote 93, Wahl, page 8. 
246 De minimis notice 2001, paragraph 6. 
247 Expedia [2012] paragraph 28 – 29. 
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Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that agreements not considered 
insignificant in the Commission de minimis notice, due to the hardcore 
nature of the agreement, e contrario should be considered appreciable 
restrictions under Art. 101(1) TFEU.248 
 
Since the case Völk, introducing the de minimis principle applicable to both 
object and effect restrictions, as will be further discussed in section 6.6.1 
below, the CJEU has in several cases stated that it is necessary to determine 
whether an agreement has as its object or effect the appreciable restriction of 
competition.249 It seems as though the statement by AG Kokott, as noted 
above in 6.1.1, could be considered a de lege ferenda argument, referring 
mainly to policy reasons. In the preliminary ruling following the opinion by 
AG Kokott, Expedia, the CJEU stated,  
 
It is settled case-law that an agreement of undertakings falls 
outside the prohibition in that provision [Article 101(1) TFEU], 
however, if it has only an insignificant effect on the market.250  
 
Furthermore, the Court stated that an agreement with a restrictive object or 
effect therefore must perceptibly restrict competition.251 In this connection a 
policy argument may be put forward for the use of a reasonable scope of the 
requirement that an agreement must appreciably effect competition. A too 
narrow scope of the exception would likely lead to more cases being 
assessed in relation to the legal exemption in Art. 101(3) TFEU and 2:2 
SCA. Ehlerman argues that,  
 
The need for exemption decisions depends on the scope of 
Article 81(1). If this scope is broad, i.e. covering a large number 
of agreements, the need for exemption decisions is also great. If, 
on the contrary, this scope is narrow, the number of exemption 
decisions will decrease accordingly.252 
 
                                                
248 Expedia [2012] paragraph 25. 
249 In BMW the CJEU held that it is necessary to assess whether an agreement restricting 
authorized BMW dealers to supply leasing companies, making the vehicles available to 
customers outside dealer’s contract territory, restricts competition to an appreciable extent, 
see BMW [1995] paragraph 2 and 18. Similarly, in relation to exclusive dealership 
agreements the CJEU held in Cabour and others that an agreement will be caught by 
Article 101(1) TFEU only if its object or effectis perceptible to restrict competition within 
the common market, Cabour [1998] paragraph 48. In case CEPSA the CJEU held that 
where it was concluded that CEPSA had, in an exclusive dealings agreement, required 
Tobar to charge a fixed or minimum sale price, the agreement would only be caught by 
Article 101(1) TFEU only if its object of effect was to appreciably restrict competition, 
CEPSA [2008], paragraph 70 – 72. In this case law from the CJEU the Court uses two 
different expressions stating the necessity to show a not merely insignificant effect on the 
market. These are that the object or effects must be either ‘perceptible’ or ‘appreciable’. In 
Cabour and Others the court stated that the object or effects must be perceptible. However, 
in CEPSA the CJEU stated that the object or effect must be ‘appreciable’, referring to the 
Cabour and Others. Hence, the two terms should likely be considered synonymous. 
250 Expedia [2012] paragraph 16. 
251 Ibid, paragraph 17. 
252 Ehlermann, page 16. 
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Similarly, Bernitz argues that the appreciability condition does not need to 
be stretched due to the possibility to apply the legal exemption.253 
Conversely, it could be argued that with limited possibilities for exemption 
decisions, the scope of 2 ch. 1 § SCA and Article 101(1) TFEU should be 
narrowed. In this connection it should be pointed out that agreements which 
have as their object the restriction of competition will generally not fulfil the 
conditions in 2:2 SCA or Article 101(3) TFEU.254 In the guidelines on 
Article 81(3) the Commission states, ‘severe restrictions of competition are 
unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 81(3)’255. Furthermore, the 
Commission held in its MasterCard decision256, 
 
Any claim that a MIF creates efficiencies within the meaning of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty must therefore be founded on a 
detailed, robust and compelling analysis that relies in its 
assumptions and deductions on empirical data and facts.257  
 
The GC later upheld the decision.258  
 
However, commentators have questioned, in light of the reasoning by the 
Commission in the MasterCard case, how anyone through empirical 
evidence can objectively quantify efficiencies in relation to Article 101(3) 
TFEU. Furthermore, it was stated that if the Commission, but not the 
applicant, could rely on non-objectively quantifiable factors it would create 
an unevenness in the applicable standard of proof.259 More generally it has 
been noted that it is hard to balance concrete efficiencies in Article 101(3) 
TFEU when there is no point of reference to balance the efficiencies 
against.260 Zenger and Walker states, ‘There is an inherent difficulty in 
balancing concrete efficiencies against abstract harm if that harm is not even 
theoretically spelled out by the authority.’261. Consequently, the limited 
scope of the de minimis principle, in cases concerning restrictions by object, 
would to a greater extent allocate a heavy burden on small and medium-
sized undertakings to prove that the conditions of the legal exemption are 
satisfied.262 
 
                                                
253 Bernitz, page 119. 
254 Bailey, page 17, See also Wetter and others, page 165f., in particular footnote 93, stating 
that the conditions where price fixing between competitors would be exempted are very 
limited. 
255 Guidelines on Article 81(3), paragraph 46. 
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As noted in section 6.1.1, a common view in the Swedish context has been 
that it is unlikely that certain agreements would be exempted from the 
prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA due to lack of effects. However, most 
commentators do not consider it impossible. Wahl notes that even object 
restrictions must realistically be able to influence competition.263 Wetter and 
others consider it improbable, but possible, that a price fixing agreement 
would escape the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA.264 In the case Bil-Bengtsson 
and others the MC stated that regardless of the precise definition of the 
relevant geographic market the market share of the parties far exceeded the 
level where it could be put into question whether horizontal price 
cooperation and market sharing appreciably restricted competition.265 
Consequently, it seems as though there is a threshold where the appreciable 
effects of an agreement could be put questioned even in cases where the 
agreement concern price fixing or market sharing. However, the scope of 
the de minimis principle in these cases is likely narrow. 
 
6.2 The Dual Application of Appreciability 
in EU Competition Law 
It is necessary to point out that the concept of appreciability is used in 
relation to two conditions within the application of Art. 101(1) TFEU. Art. 
101(1) TFEU states that agreements ‘which may affect trade between 
Member States’ shall be prohibited and according to EU case law the 
influence must be appreciable.266 It aims to prevent agreements which might 
harm the attainment of the objectives of a single market, in particular by 
partitioning the national markets or affecting the structure of competition 
within the common market.267 The standard test to determine whether an 
agreement may affect trade between member states was put forward in 
Société Technique Minière268. The CJEU stated that  
 
It must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of 
probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of 
fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct 
or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States.269  
 
The term ‘pattern of trade’ has been considered neutral, not requiring that 
competition is restricted or reduced. Art. 101(1) TFEU may therefore apply 
even to non-restrictive agreements.270   
                                                
263 Wahl, page 8. 
264 Wetter and others, page 165f., See in particular footnote 93. 
265 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 16. 
266 Béguelin [1971] paragraph 16. 
267 Hugin [1979], paragraph 17, Ortiz, page 27. 
268 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) 
[1966] E.C.R. English Special Edition Page 00235. 
269 Société Technique Minière [1966], page 249. 
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However, Faull & Nikpay point out that the alleged restriction of 
competition may indicate the ability to affect trade.271  
 
Art. 101(1) TFEU further prohibits all agreements between undertakings, 
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
have as their ‘object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the internal market […]’272. In EU case law it has been 
stated, as will be discussed throughout the following chapter, that the 
restriction of competition must be appreciable or constitute not merely an 
insignificant effect.273  
 
In the decisional practice of the Commission and the EU case law the 
application of the appreciability condition in relation to effect on trade and 
restriction of competition has not always been clear and consistent.274 Bailey 
notes that the intermingling of the two concepts has been a complicating 
factor settling the law concerning the de minimis doctrine.275 In the case of 
Völk the CJEU stated that both conditions must be understood by reference 
to the actual circumstances of the case. Consequently, the Court held, an 
agreement with only an insignificant effect, taking into consideration the 
weak position of the parties, falls outside the prohibition of Art. 101(1) 
TFEU. This statement has been referenced in relation to effect on trade and 
restriction of competition.276 In the following sections reference will be 
made to case law succeeding Völk but which relate to the appreciable effect 
on trade because the same considerations apply to the effect on competition 
condition.277 However, in Ziegler278 the CFI rejected the applicants 
objection regarding appreciability in relation to restriction of competition 
since the applicant had failed to distinguish between appreciability in 
relation to effect on trade and restriction of competition.279  
 
6.3 Recent Developments 
In Expedia the CJEU had to consider the relationship between Article 
101(1) TFEU and Art. 3(1) and 3(2) Regulation 1/2003. Art. 3(1) 
Regulation 1/2003 states that when an agreement may affect trade, a 
national authority shall apply Art. 101(1) TFEU as well as the national 
provisions.  
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Art. 3(2) Regulation 1/2003 states that when there is parallel application of 
the rules, the application of national rules may not prohibit agreements 
which do not restrict competition within the meaning of Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
Consequently, the CJEU found that when an agreement may affect trade a 
Competition Authority of a Member State may not prohibit the agreement if 
it does not perceptibly restrict competition within the internal market.280 The 
CJEU further held that ‘[…] an agreement that may affect trade between 
Member States and that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its 
nature and independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an 
appreciable restriction on competition.’281 Hence, the judgement connects 
the appreciability condition in relation to effect on trade with appreciability 
in relation to restriction of competition. In light of the case it must be 
viewed as sufficient to establish 1) that an agreement has as its object the 
restriction of trade and 2) that it may affect trade between Member States, in 
order to find an appreciable restriction of competition.  
 
Consequently, ‘pattern of trade’ may no longer be seen as neutral and 
disconnected from the restriction of competition condition in relation to 
restrictions by object. This is because a restriction by object that effect trade 
also necessarily restricts competition to an appreciable extent. According to 
EU case law an appreciable affect on trade has generally been found where 
the market shares of the parties have been approximately 5 %.282 In light of 
the two cases Expedia and Ziegler the two concepts should be viewed as 
distinct but inter-connected. Throughout this paper appreciability will refer 
to restriction of competition if not indicated otherwise. 
 
6.4 Determining ‘To an Appreciable 
Extent’ 
An agreement falls outside of the scope of the prohibition  if it lacks effects 
of any significance. While the distinction between restrictions by object or 
effect considers the actual, potential or presumed effects, appreciability 
considers whether the magnitude of the eventual effects would be 
appreciable. Hence, the analysis of appreciability does not determine 
whether an agreement has had, is likely to result in, or may be presumed to 
result in anti-competitive effects.283 In Prym284 the GC explained that the 
Commission is not obliged to quantify the anti-competitive effects of the 
restriction of competition, but must provide sufficient reasoning to show 
that the agreement is capable to appreciably restrict competition.285  
  
                                                
280 Expedia [2012] paragraph 19. 
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In this connection it should be pointed out that it is the agreement as a 
whole, and not the participation of an individual undertaking, that may be 
considered to provide only insignificant effects.286 Hence, a submission that 
the involvement of one of the parties was insignificant, and that the 
prohibition therefore is not applicable, should be rejected. 
 
The assessment of appreciability considers two aspects of the agreement, 
namely quantitative and qualitative factors. The former relates to an 
empirical assessment of the parties’ market power and the latter to an 
abstract assessment of the agreement’s content.287 In this connection Wahl 
has noted that the requirement that an agreement must appreciably effect 
competition creates a quantitative as well as a qualitative safe harbour for 
restrictions of competition.288 The following sections examine what falls 
inside the scope of the quantitative and qualitative parts of the assessment. 
The first section look at the guidelines put forward by the CA and the 
Commission. The following sections examine quantitative and then 
qualitative factors in relation to both EU and Swedish case law. 
 
6.5 Guidelines  
In light of the preparatory works and with guidance of EU competition rules 
the CA issued the Swedish de minimis notice 1993.289 The notice, relying on 
a purely quantitative definition of appreciability, stated that an agreement do 
not restrict competition to an appreciable extent if the aggregate market 
share of the parties do not exceed 10 % and none of the parties annual 
turnover exceed 200 million Sek.290  
 
Since then both the Commission and the CA has issued new notices on 
agreements of minor importance.291 The current Swedish de minimis 
notice292 mirrors the current Commission de minimis notice in all, for the 
purpose of this paper, relevant parts.293 The three main differences, which 
has evolved through the amendments of the notices are that: 
 
1. the quantitative threshold is an aggregate market share of the 
undertakings of 10 % in relation to horizontal agreements and 15 % 
in relation to vertical agreements,  
2. the guidelines are not applicable in relation to hardcore restrictions 
as listed in paragraph 11 of the Commission notice on agreements of 
minor importance, and  
                                                
286 Bellamy & Child, page 169, paragraph 2.156. 
287 Ortiz, page 4. 
288 Wahl, page 13f. 
289 KKVFS 1993:2 de minimis notice, paragraph 1.3 – 1.4. 
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291 De minimis notice 1997, paragraph 9 – 11, De minimis notice 2001, KKVFS 1999:1 de 
minimis notice, KKVFS 2009:1 de minimis notice. 
292 KKVFS 2009:1 de minimis notice. 
293 Ibid, paragraph 4 and 9. 
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3. small and medium-sized undertakings are not specifically referred to 
as rarely being capable of affecting competition.294  
 
As hardcore restrictions generally may be presumed to restrict competition 
by object, it follows that in the absolute majority of these cases the 
thresholds set out in the Commission and Swedish de minimis notices may 
not be applied.295 Consequently, they provide no direct guidance as to the 
threshold of appreciability in relation to object restrictions. 
 
In the Commission de minimis notice 1997 it was stated that agreements 
between small and medium-sized undertakings were rarely capable of 
significantly restrict trade between Member States and competition. Where 
these agreements would meet the conditions in Art. 101(1) TFEU they were 
still considered not to be of sufficient community interest and would 
therefore not result in proceedings instituted by the Commission. The 
exception did however exclude agreements where competition was 
significantly restricted in a substantial part of the relevant market, or where 
there were network effects.296 This led the applicant in Ventouris297 to argue 
that the agreement was of minor importance since the applicant came within 
the category of small and medium-sized enterprises298 (SMEs). The GC 
stated that only agreements where all parties where SMEs were capable of 
falling outside the scope of the prohibition. In the case in question only two 
of the parties could be regarded as SMEs. Furthermore, the Court stated that 
the cartel restricted competition significantly in a substantial part of the 
market. Consequently, the plea was rejected.299 Similarly, the MC 
considered that the relevant undertakings in VIVO were predominantly 
SMEs.300 This consideration was not specifically analysed, but was instead 
part of the overall assessment conducted by the Court. It is therefore 
difficult to assess the relevance it had on the reasoning by the Court. 
 
In the current de minimis notice the Commission only mention SMEs in 
relation to affect on trade and not competition.301 However, as noted in 
section 6.1.2, the notice is without prejudice to the interpretation of the EU 
courts.302 It is therefore unclear what relevance the amended de minimis 
notice has on the case law relating to SMEs as stated in Ventouris303.  
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Possibly, the term SME will not be used as an individual claim, but instead 
the circumstances relating to the size of the relevant undertakings will be 
considered as a quantitative factor in the appreciability assessment, which 
will be further discussed in the following sections.  
 
6.6 The Quantitative Aspect in Article 
101(1) TFEU 
In EU the relevance of the position of the parties was recognized in an early 
case in the late 1960s, Völk, which has since then been widely referred to.304 
The quantitative aspect is empirical in nature and considers the position of 
the parties on the relevant market, i.e. the market power exercised by the 
parties. The market position of the parties is generally determined, as will be 
shown in the following sections, by analysing the size of the companies and 
their market shares on the relevant market. 
 
In order to get a better understanding of how the quantitative aspect has 
been interpreted and applied in Swedish case law, it is necessary to look at 
the interpretation by the EU courts as well as the Swedish case law. 
However, the Swedish case law on the subject is limited. Therefore, the 
following sections commence with an examination of the EU case law.  
Thereafter, the Swedish case law is considered. The aim of these sections is 
to clarify the level of market power necessary to find that an object 
restriction does not restrict competition to an appreciable extent. Lastly, I 
examine what factors are relevant in order to find that an agreement restrict 
competition to an appreciable extent. 
 
6.6.1 Position and Importance of the Parties 
In Völk the CJEU got the opportunity to clarify the relevance of ‘the 
position an importance of the parties’, which was earlier pointed out in STM 
as a factor to consider when determining whether or not an agreement 
restrict competition to an appreciable extent.305 The agreement in Völk was a 
vertical agreement with absolute territorial protection. Mr Völk’s production 
represented 0.08 % of the total production on the common market, and 0.2 
% in Germany. The contract bound Vervaecke to distribute products 
representing 0.6 % of the market in Belgium and Luxemburg. The Court 
stated that an agreement falls outside the scope of the prohibition in Art. 
101(1) TFEU ‘when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking 
into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the 
market of the product in question.’306.  
                                                
304 See for example Miller [1978] paragraph 10 and Musique Diffusion française [1983] 
paragraph 84. 
305 Société Technique Minière [1966] page 250. 
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This was a general statement and the Court noted that it applied even though 
the case at hand concerned absolute territorial protection. These restrictions 
have generally been viewed as object restrictions.307  
 
The general statement that object and effect restrictions must restrict 
competition to an appreciable extent has been reaffirmed in several other 
cases.308 In AG Gand’s opinion in Völk he argued that, depending on the 
positions of the parties, the Court could assess two contracts of the same 
type differently. He further noted that the changes in competition must not 
be only theoretical.309 The case provides a general de minimis principle, 
which does not discriminate between restrictions by effect or object. 
However, considering the market share relevant in the case, less then 1 %, 
the scope of the de minimis principle is relatively narrow.  
 
In a similar case Miller310 the applicant Miller instituted a procedure against 
a Commission decision, in which it was stated that an exclusive dealing 
agreement constituted an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. The CJEU 
initially noted that a clause prohibiting export does, by its very nature, 
restrict competition.311 In regard to the position on the market the Court 
noted that Miller had a total market share of approximately 5 %, but may 
have an appreciably larger market share in certain specialized categories of 
the market.312 The Court found that it was not necessary to settle whether 
the relevant product market was the more general market of sound 
recordings or a more narrowly defined market because it was evident that 
Miller’s sales constituted ‘a not inconsiderable proportion of the market’313 
and occupied an at least important position in the market of certain distinct 
categories of products.314 Hence, in addition to the market share of the 
parties, the Court took into account the importance of the parties in certain 
segments of the market by distinguishing between a general and a more 
specialized market.  
 
In the preliminary ruling Expedia the CJEU got an opportunity to clarify the 
interpretation and application of the appreciability condition. As noted in 
section 6.3 the CJEU examined the relationship between Article 101(1) 
TFEU and Article 3(2) Regulation 1/2003. Moreover, the Court held that an 
agreement must have the object or effect of perceptibly restrict competition.  
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The CJEU stated in this connection that the market share thresholds in the 
Commission de minimis notice may be considered a factor, but not a 
requirement, used in order to determine whether an agreement appreciably 
restrict competition.315 The CJEU further held that an object restriction, 
which may affect trade between Member States, by its very nature restricts 
competition to an appreciable extent. Agreements have generally been 
presumed to affect trade when the aggregate market share of the parties has 
been around 5 %.316  
 
These two statements above may indicate, by analogy, that agreements 
which have as their object the restriction of competition should be 
considered by their very nature to restrict competition to an appreciable 
extent in relation to 2 ch. 1 § SCA when the aggregate market share of the 
parties is at least around 5 %. This conclusion may be compared with  Faull 
and Nikpay arguing, in light of Völk and Miller, that vertical agreements 
where the parties have a market share less than 1 % is insignificant. 
Furthermore, that an aggregate market share exceeding 5 % is appreciable, 
and that between 1 – 5 % there is a grey zone. The by the Court connects the 
case law on the concept of appreciable effect on trade with the concept of  
appreciable restriction of competition in such a way that once affect on trade 
has been established, for example when the scope of the relevant agreement 
is nation wide317, an object restriction is necessarily appreciable. It may 
therefore be seen as providing a ‘shortcut’ to establish an appreciable 
restriction of competition in object cases.  
 
6.6.2 The Market Structure 
In his opinion in Miller, AG Warner argued that it was not only the market 
share that was relevant, but also production and turnover in absolute terms. 
This reasoning was echoed in Musique Diffusion Française318 where 
Musique Diffusion Française and other distributors of Pioneer, commenced 
proceedings against a Commission decision, which claimed that the 
applicants had been involved in concerted practices which had as its object 
the restriction of competition.319 The applicants submitted, inter alia, that 
the Commission had erred in calculating the market shares of the 
distributors. They argued that the market share was just above 3 %, and not 
close to 10% as stated by the Commission.  
 
The CJEU noted that a closer examination of the market shares would be 
unnecessary if the market shares indicated by the applicants could confirm 
an appreciable affect on trade.320  
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The Court referred to Völk but held that the position of the parties could not 
be considered weak. The relevant market was fragmented and the 
applicants’ market share consequently exceeded most of their competitors. 
The Court considered the relative position of the applicants in relation to 
their competitors, but also pointed out the turnover in absolute numbers as a 
relevant factor. Consequently, the Court held that the conduct was capable 
of influencing the pattern of trade between Member States.321  
 
The reasoning in the judgement mirrored, in most part, AG Sir Gordon 
Slynn’s opinion, who also noted that smaller market shares are more likely 
to restrict competition where ‘the lion’s share of the market is divided more 
or less evenly between a dozen or so enterprises […]’322 since it indicates a 
strong position on the market. On the other hand, similar market shares may 
indicate a relatively weak position if the enterprise is ‘dwarfed by one or 
two major competitors.’323  
 
The above-mentioned case law has been recognized by the Commission in 
its decisional practice. In the MasterCard decision it stated, ‘The primary 
focus for analysing whether there is an appreciable effect on competition is 
the position and importance of the parties on the market taking into account 
the market structure.’324 Although it is generally the aggregate market share 
of the parties that is relevant, the Commission states in its guidelines on 
horizontal co-operation agreements325,  
 
If one of just two parties has only an insignificant market share 
and if it does not possess important resources, even a high 
combined market share normally cannot be seen as indicating a 
likely restrictive effect on competition in the market.326  
 
Furthermore, the necessity to view an agreement in its economic and legal 
context taking into account the functioning and structure of the market was 
pointed out in Expedia327.  
 
One factor to take into consideration when analysing the market structure is 
whether there are parallel agreements which might create a network effect. 
In Delimitis328 the CJEU had to determine whether a bundle of supply 
agreements containing an exclusive purchasing clause could collectively 
affect trade to an appreciable extent.329  
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The CJEU stated that the existence of a bundle of similar agreements was a 
factor to consider when determining whether an agreement, in light of its 
economic and legal context, restricted access to the relevant market.330  
 
Where the agreement is part of a bundle of agreements, the individual 
agreement must, by the position of the parties and the duration of the 
agreement, provide an appreciable contribution to the foreclosure effect on 
the relevant market.331 Hence, in Neste Markkinointi Oy332 the CJEU found 
that an exclusive purchasing agreement with a one year termination notice 
did not make a significant contribution to the cumulative effect on the 
market. The Court considered the duration and that the agreement 
represented only a small proportion of similar agreements entered into by 
the supplier.333 
 
The above noted case law points out the relevance of the structure of the 
market. The statement in Musique Diffusion française, where the fact that 
the market was fragmented was used to highlight the importance of the 
parties although they had relatively small market shares, could be compared 
to the approach taken by the Commission in the case Villeroy & Boch334. In 
that case the Commission found that it was out of the question that the co-
operation between Villeroy and Boch and its network of retailers could 
facilitate collusion aimed at excluding competing firms. The reasons for this 
was that the market was fragmented, the number of producers too great and 
the circle of distribution too open and ill-defined.335  
 
In relation to the importance of the market concentration and whether the 
market is fragmented, Bellamy & Child note, ‘where the market is 
concentrated, the likely effect on competition of restrictive provisions 
involving major competitors is enhanced’336. Furthermore, Bishop and 
Walker point out that, in general, the demand curve facing suppliers 
becomes more elastic when the number of firms increases. This is because 
the consumers, in the event of a price increase, have more suppliers to turn 
to.337 However, the authors continue, one significant deficiency with using 
concentration ratios, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index338, is that it 
does not take into account the relative size of the competitors.  
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Hence, the concentration ratio would not consider whether the market had a 
clear potential leader or the companies were struggling to become the 
largest firm, which could effect competition on the market.339 Consequently, 
the market structure and concentration on the market may be used to 
indicate the ability to influence the market. However, other factors, such as 
the relative importance of the parties as stated in Musique Diffusion 
française, should also be considered a relevant factor.  
 
6.6.3 Cases Where Other Factors May Be 
Relevant 
In certain cases the aggregate market share of the parties may not be a good 
indicator on the ability to influence the market. On some markets, such as 
emerging markets, the parties may not yet hold any market shares or 
produce any turnover. This may be the case where the parties are entering a 
new market due to technological or medical advancement.340 In these cases 
relevant factors to consider could instead be ‘the position of the parties on 
related product markets or their strength in technologies relating to the 
agreement.’341 Another example of markets where market shares may be 
poor indicators of market power is bidding markets. Bishop and Walker note 
that where tenders are large and infrequent, a relatively limited number of 
firms may be sufficient to provide fierce competition due to the 
consequences of failing to win the bid. However, they continue, most 
bidding markets do not have these characteristics. In these cases other 
methods of analysing the markets can be used, such as testing whether the 
undertakings are close competitors.342 Consequently, while market shares 
may be viewed as the primary tool to assess the position of the parties on the 
market, it may not be a reliable indicator in all cases, depending on the 
market characteristics. 
6.6.4 Conclusion  
It is settled case law that an agreement, which has as its object or effect the 
restriction of competition may escape the prohibition in Article 101(1) 
TFEU if the effects would not be appreciable. However, in relation to 
agreements with a restrictive object the scope of this quantitative safe 
harbour is relatively unclear. In terms of market shares exclusive dealing 
agreements with absolute territorial protection has been found by the CJEU 
not to restrict competition appreciably when the aggregate shares of the 
parties were less than 1 %. However, aggregate market shares exceeding 5 
% has generally been held by the CJEU to constitute an appreciable 
restriction of competition.  
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341 Ibid, paragraph 52. 
342 Bishop & Walker, page 576, paragraph 12-001 – 12.002. 
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Where the combined market share has been around 2 – 3 % the CJEU has 
found, in combination with the relative importance of the parties and the 
turnover in absolute numbers, that the agreement restricted competition to 
an appreciable extent. Possibly, the approximate market share of 5 % may 
be viewed as a threshold where an object restriction may be put into 
question, or in other words where the harm is no longer obvious. It may then 
be necessary to consider other factors, such as the concentration on the 
market, the relative importance of the parties or the nature of the products, 
in order to establish whether or not an agreement appreciably restricts 
competition. 
 
6.7 The Quantitative Aspect in 2 ch. 1 § 
SCA 
In the preparatory work of the SCA the appreciability condition was 
primarily focused on the quantitative aspect, i.e. the position of the parties. 
The Government stated that cooperation between small and medium-sized 
undertakings with a small aggregate market share should normally lack 
significance for competition. Hence, the Government stated that the decisive 
factor when assessing the appreciable extent of a restriction of competition 
is the size and market share of the relevant undertakings.343 However, the 
preparatory work left it for the judiciary to further determine when an 
agreement does not appreciably restrict competition. Furthermore, as noted 
in section 6.5, the application of the Swedish de minimis notice is generally 
precluded due to the exemption of hardcore restriction and provides no 
guidance in relation to object restrictions.  
 
6.7.1 The Priority Policy 
Swedish case law concerning the appreciability condition, in particular cases 
where the courts have conducted a closer examination of the quantitative 
aspect, is scarce. One reason for this may be the prioritization policy put 
forward by the CA. The policy aims to provide transparency in the 
prioritization of competition and procurement cases. The policy states that 
the CA must be selective in its choice of cases and focus on cases of public 
interest, which leads to clear results. When prioritizing, the CA considers, 
inter alia, the severity of the issue in question. The severity of the issue 
depends on what negative effects it may have on competition and 
consequently on the public and consumers. Furthermore, the severity may 
depend on whether the issue is widespread on the Swedish market and if the 
market is characterized by a small number of competitors and weak 
competition.344  
                                                
343 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 73 (unofficial translation). 
344 Competition Authority Priority policy. 
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Consequently, it is possible that the reason why cases, where the parties 
have held a relatively insignificant position on the market, have not reached 
the MC is due to the fact that they have not been prioritized by the CA. In 
many cases the market share of the parties has been sufficient for the MC to 
find that the agreement appreciably restrict competition regardless of the 
precise definition of the relevant market.345 However, the following section 
will examine the existing case law and in particular focus on the case Bil-
Bengtsson and others, which provide the best guidance as to the application 
of a quantitative threshold. 
 
6.7.2 Position, Importance of the Parties and 
the Market Structure 
Like the preparatory works of the SCA, the MC has recognized the 
magnitude of an agreement as a relevant factor to consider when 
determining whether or not an agreement appreciably restricts competition. 
In the recent case KIA the MC stated that an assessment of the appreciable 
effects of an agreement should take into account the magnitude and the 
nature of the agreement. The Court held that the magnitude is based on the 
size and market share of the undertakings. Furthermore, the nature is based 
on whether the restriction negatively influenced competition to an 
appreciable extent. The MC held that the market share, which was 
considered very large, alone allowed the Court to find that the agreement 
appreciably restricted competition.  
 
In contrast to the decision in KIA the MC found in VIVO that a horizontal 
price fixing agreement did not appreciably restrict competition. VIVO 
argued that the competition was so fierce, in particular in relation to ICA 
and KF, that the quantitative thresholds had to be placed significantly higher 
than in other industries.346 The Court stated that the parties’ market share 
was one of several factors to consider when determining the position of the 
parties. The MC also pointed out that other circumstances, important to the 
competition situation on the market, must be taken into account as well. The 
MC held that the applicants’ submission stating that there was fierce 
competition on the market should be accepted and that the members of 
VIVO were predominantly SMEs. The Court further noted that the 10 % 
market share of the parties was relatively small. Consequently, the MC did 
not find that the cooperation could effect the prices on the market 
appreciably.347  
 
 
                                                
345 VVS-installatörerna [2005] page 10f., where the applicants had an aggregate market 
share of around 70 %. See also NCC and others [2009], page 50 where the Court held that 
the influence exercised by the parties was significant, and Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008], 
page 16, where the parties were found to have an aggregate market share of around 20 %. 
346 VIVO [1997] page 9. 
347 Ibid, page 8f. 
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In light of the development of EU case law, and with regard to the 
inherently harmful nature of horizontal price fixing agreements, it is the 
author’s view that it is unlikely that the 10 % market share would be 
considered insignificant today, even in the context of fierce inter-brand 
competition.  
 
Perhaps, the MC accepted the argument put forward by the applicant that 
the fierce competition raised the quantitative threshold of appreciable 
effects. The Court may have considered, in contrast to the case Musique 
Diffusion française, that VIVO was dwarfed by its competitors ICA and KF. 
The statement regarding the market share of VIVO may also be viewed in 
light of the fact that the members of VIVO was predominantly SMEs, and 
that the preparatory work states that these agreements normally are 
insignificant for competition when the aggregate market share is around 10 
%.348  
 
In IL Returpapper and others349 the MC took into account the structure of 
the market finding that the agreement did not restrict competition to an 
appreciable extent. In the case several undertakings cooperated in their 
purchase of recycled paper. The MC stated that the cooperating parties held 
a significant position on the market, with an aggregate market share of 
around 65 % according to the CA, but that there was a significant 
competitive pressure on the market. This was partly due to the fact that the 
European market was considered an alternative source for buyers and 
sellers. In light of these considerations, as well as other qualitative 
considerations that will be discussed in section 6.8, the MC found that the 
agreement did not appreciably restrict competition.350 Another case where 
the MC took into account the structure of the market was Svenska 
Petroliuminstitutet351 stating that the market was oligopolistic and highly 
concentrated.352 
 
6.7.3 Bil-Bengtsson and Others v Competition 
Authority 
The case Bil-Bengtsson and others concerned restrictive cooperation 
between eight distributors of Volvo and Renault cars in the provinces of 
Skåne and Blekinge. The CA claimed that the applicants had directly or 
indirectly fixed prices and rebates, but had also divided and shared the 
market.353 The DC initially stated that the cooperation had as its object the 
restriction of competition.  
                                                
348 Prop. 1992/93:56, page 73. 
349 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1999:11 (Swed.) IL Returpapper and others v 
Competition Authority. 
350 Ibid, page 24ff. 
351 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1999:20 (Swed.) Svenska Petroliuminstitutet v 
Competition Authority. 
352 Ibid, page 20. 
353 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 9. 
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However, the Court held that the restriction still had to appreciably effect 
competition, taking into consideration the magnitude and nature of the 
agreement. The magnitude of the agreement was considered to relate to the 
size and market share of the parties. The nature of the agreement was 
considered to relate to whether the cooperation had appreciable negative 
influence on competition, in relation to the underlying considerations of the 
SCA.   
 
The CA argued that the relevant geographic market was limited to Skåne 
and Blekinge. However, The DC stated, rejecting the market definition 
provided by the CA as insufficient, that the relevant market was 
considerably larger than Skåne and Blekinge. The Court found that the 
market share of the applicants in relation to new cars was approximately 20 
% in Skåne and Blekinge and 3 % in Sweden. In relation to used cars the 
market share was 4 % in Skåne and Blekinge and 0.5 % in Sweden. The 
Court stated that it could not find that the market share was big enough to, 
by that fact alone, show that the cooperation appreciably restricted 
competition. The DC therefore went on to analyse the nature of the 
agreement. The Court found, inter alia due to the vertical control by the 
general agent of the distributors, already available price statistics and lack of 
effects on the market, that the cooperation did not appreciably effect 
competition.354 
 
On appeal to the MC the CA used a slightly different market definition, 
adding one province to the definition originally stated in the DC. The MC 
initially held that even though 2 ch. 1 § SCA does not consider any conduct 
prohibited per se, there is a strong presumption that the type of conduct 
relevant in the case restrict competition. The MC found the market 
definition provided by the CA to be reasonable. The Court stated that, 
regardless of the precise definition of the market, the threshold where 
horizontal price fixing and market sharing agreements may be put into 
question was far exceeded.355 The Court held that the influence of the 
undertakings on the relevant market had been significant which, in 
connection with the serious nature of the cooperation, restricted competition 
to an appreciable extent. 356 
 
The case is interesting due to the fact that the DC and the MC came to two 
opposite conclusions regarding the question of appreciability. The DC 
conducted a relatively thorough analysis of the appreciability condition and 
considered the magnitude as well as the nature of the conduct. Furthermore, 
the analysis by the DC may be viewed as dividing the assessment into two 
parts. The first part considers whether an agreement may be deemed to 
appreciably restricts competition to an appreciable extent, based solely on 
the size and market share of the parties.  
 
                                                
354 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2006] page 66ff.  
355 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008], page 16. 
356 Ibid, page 16. 
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When the magnitude of the agreement alone does not provide conclusive 
proof that the agreement would have appreciable effects on competition, it is 
necessary to further analyse factors relating to the nature of the agreement. 
The reasoning may perhaps be compared with determining if the restriction, 
based on the market share of the parties, is obvious or need further analysis. 
It is interesting to note that the market share of the parties, according to the 
definition accepted by the DC, was within the grey area mentioned in 
section 6.6.1. 
 
It is hard to assess the relevance of the statements made by the DC since the 
MC did not comment on this reasoning in its judgement. The MC assessed 
the appreciability condition in a more summary manner noticing the 
position of the parties in connection with the serious nature of the conduct. 
However, due to the differing opinions on the definition of the relevant 
market the starting point of the assessment was different. Consequently, the 
MC did not have to conduct a deeper analysis in order to satisfy the 
appreciability condition. It is interesting that the MC explicitly made 
reference to a threshold below which it may be questioned whether object 
restrictions, such as involving price fixing and market sharing, appreciably 
effect competition. 
 
6.8 The Qualitative Aspect  
The qualitative aspect of an appreciable restriction of competition implicate, 
as noted in section 6.4 above, an abstract analysis of the content of an 
agreement. In Swedish case law it has been referred to as analysing the 
nature of the agreement to determine whether the negative effects it may 
have on competition are appreciable.357 Carl Wetter and others note that the 
effect on competition should be evaluated in relation to the considerations 
underlying competition law.358 It could be argued that the appreciability 
condition consists only of the quantitative aspect as the qualitative aspect of 
the restriction already has been considered when determining the object of 
the agreement. However, as the following sections will show, the qualitative 
aspect of the appreciability condition has been considered in both Swedish 
and EU case law. 
 
Following the introduction of the SCA, several judgements by the MC 
clarified that other factors, in addition to quantitative, are relevant in the 
assessment of the condition ‘appreciable extent’.359 In the case Taxi 
trafikförening360 the MC had to consider whether concerted taxi services, in 
particular a common order central, was infringing 2 ch. 1 § SCA.  
                                                
357 KIA [2012] paragraph 208 – 209. 
358 Wetter and others, page 175, in particular footnote 132, See also Case Bil-Bengtsson and 
others [2006] page 66. 
359 Taxi trafikförening [1996] page 7f., Sydsvensk Färskpotatis [1997] page 11, IL 
Returpapper [1999] page 25 
360 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1996:4 (Swed.) Taxi trafikförening u.p.a v Små 
Taxiägares Intresse Organisation. 
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The MC held that the aggregate market share of the parties is only one of 
many factor to consider when determining the parties’ position on the 
market. The Court took into account that the market was characterized by 
intense competition and that the parties’ cooperation in fact had not 
prevented or restricted the competition.361 In VIVO, the MC initially stated 
that the conduct of VIVO, which was an association of undertakings in the 
retail market, was in fact price collusion.362 The Court reaffirmed the 
judgement in TFF and added that whether cooperation restricts competition 
to an appreciable extent must be analysed having regard to the actual 
conditions under which it applies.363 
 
It has been clearly stated in recent case law that both qualitative and 
quantitative factors should be considered in order to establish whether an 
agreement may restrict competition to an appreciable extent.364 In KIA the 
MC stated that the nature of the agreement should be considered as well as 
the magnitude, and that this involved determining whether the negative 
effect on competition may be deemed appreciable.365 Carl Wetter and others 
state that it is obvious that qualitative factors should be taken into account, 
considering the underlying socioeconomic function of the competition 
rules.366 They further argue that every application of the prohibition against 
restrictions of competition should be preceded by a qualitative assessment. 
However, the need to conduct a qualitative analysis is naturally less 
apparent when it is obvious that an agreement has as its object the restriction 
of competition.367 
 
Due to the abstract nature of the assessment, it is not possible to make an 
absolute demarcation as to what constitutes a qualitatively appreciable 
restriction of competition. Instead, cases could be organized in categories 
where the courts have relied on qualitative factors to find that an agreement 
was not appreciable. Such categories must, due to varied circumstances and 
the changing markets, be indicative and non-exhaustive.  
 
                                                
361 Ibid, page 7f. 
362 VIVO [1997] page 7. 
363 VIVO [1997] page 8f., See also Sydsvensk Färskpotatis [1997] page 11, where the MC 
had to determine whether information sharing concerning future output of cultivated 
potatoes appreciably restricted competition. The Court stated that it was common ground 
that the information could affect the output and actions of the parties. However, the Court 
stated that the effects was, due to certain industry specific factors, was only negligible, 
Cementa [1997], page 7 where the MC held that an agreement between the parties could 
not have an appreciable effect on the market considering that neither of the parties 
realistically could have submitted an offer in the procurement in question.  
364 See Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 16, where the MC found that the influence of 
the parties on the market had been significant which, in connection with the severe nature 
of the agreement, constituted an appreciable restriction of competition. See also Svenska 
Bilsportförbundet [2012] page 136 – 139 (referring to the decision of the Competition 
Authority, see decision Svenska Bilsportförbundet [2009], paragraph 205 - 206), where the 
MC stated that the absolute prohibition, in a decision by an association of undertakings, to 
partake in motor racing other than provided thoose organized by the association. 
365 KIA [2012] paragraph 208 – 209. 
366 Wetter and others, page 118. 
367 Ibid, page 176, in particular footnote 135. 
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The following sections examine some of the Swedish and EU case law, 
where agreements have been considered to be qualitatively insignificant, in 
two categories. It does not consider the categories mentioned in section 
4.2.4 (limitations that do not restrict competition or ancillary restraints), due 
to the reasons provided in that section of the paper. 
 
6.8.1 The Restriction May in Itself Be 
Qualitatively Insignificant 
Both in Swedish and EU case law the courts have considered whether or not 
a restriction of competition does amount to a qualitatively significant 
restriction. In the early case Sydsvensk färskpotatis368 the MC had to 
determine whether information sharing concerning future output in the 
potato growing industry could be considered to appreciably restrict 
competition. The parties sharing information held on average a market share 
of around 27 % and during the harvest season around 70 %. The Court 
stated that it was common ground that the relevant type of information 
could affect output by the relevant undertakings. However, the MC found 
that due to the circumstances of the case the potato growers could not adapt 
their output in relation to the information received. Consequently, the 
information could not be considered to appreciably restrict competition.369  
 
Similarly, the MC considered the undertakings’ ability to adapt their 
commercial behaviour according to information provided by an agreement 
in Svenska Petroliuminstitutet. The MC noted that the information only 
included general monthly sales information and that the undertakings 
obtained the price information before they got the statistics relevant in the 
case. Furthermore the Court considered that the fact that the information 
was national, and that there were provincial differences in price, mitigated 
the risk for negative effects.370 In the recent case KIA the MC rejected the 
argument concerning the qualitative factor that the agreement in question 
did not appreciably restrict competition since the agreement only covered a 
three year, and not the seven year, guarantee for service of cars.371 
 
A similar approach was taken by the CJEU when assessing the qualitative 
aspect of the restriction in Pavlov372. The Court considered whether a 
supplementary pension scheme, for medical specialists and managed by a 
single fund, restricted competition to an appreciable extent. The Court found 
that the pension scheme standardised only one cost factor of specialist 
medical services.  
                                                
368 Marknadsdomstolen [MD] Market Court 1997:5 (Swed.) Sydsvensk Färskpotatis 
ekonomisk förening v the Swedish Competition Authority. 
369 Ibid, page 9ff. 
370 Svenska Petroliuminstitutet [1999] page 19f. 
371 KIA [2012] paragraph 210, See also Uponor [2003] page 5. 
372 Joined cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds 
Medische Specialisten [2000] I-06451. 
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Furthermore, the Court found that the cost had only a marginal or indirect 
influence on the final cost of the services provided and was therefore not 
appreciable.373  
 
In Bagnasco374 the CJEU held that collusion, which excluded the right for 
customers to adopt fixed interest rate, could not, due to objective factors 
such as changes in the money market, have an appreciable restrictive effect 
on competition.375 Similarly, the Commission has in its decisional practice 
taken into account qualitative insignificance as a factor when assessing 
appreciability. In the Commission UEFA decision376 the Commission found 
that a regulation, limiting national associations under certain circumstances 
to broadcast football, did not appreciably restrict competition. The 
Commission stated that the regulation did not have an anti-competitive 
object but that it may result in broadcasters being unable to broadcast 
football events live when they whish. However, considering, inter alia, the 
limited duration of the limitation and the restricted scope of the limitation 
the Commission held that the regulation did not appreciably restrict 
competition.377 
 
In conclusion, the factors that may be considered assessing the significance 
of a restriction are diverse and contextual. However, it seems as though both 
Swedish and EU courts have generally considered objective factors limiting 
the ability to affect competition in order to find that an agreement does not 
qualitatively restrict competition to an appreciable extent. In cases 
concerning information sharing the assessment has been focused on whether 
or not the information actually could be used in an anti-competitive way or 
whether the ability to do so has been restricted by factors not relating to the 
parties. In other cases, primarily in EU case law, the duration and scope of 
the restriction have been considered. 
 
6.8.2 National Legislation 
One specific objective factor, considered in both Swedish and EU case law, 
is whether there is legislation that affects and direct the actions of the 
undertakings. In IL Returpapper and others the MC stated that the 
cooperation, concerning recycled paper, had to be assessed in light of 
legislation requiring producers to collect recycled paper, and authority 
regulations provided by the Environmental Protection Agency (Swed. 
Naturvårdsverket).  
                                                
373 Ibid, paragraph 93 – 97. 
374 Joined cases C-215/96 and C-216/96 Carlo Bagnasco and Others v Banca Popolare di 
Novara soc. coop. arl. (BNP) (C-215/96) and Cassa di Risparmio di Genova e Imperia SpA 
(Carige) (C-216/96) [1999] E.C.R. I-00135. 
375 Ibid, paragraph 35. 
376 UEFA’s broadcasting regulations (Case 37.576) Commission Decision 2001/478/EC 
[2001] OJ L 171/12. 
377 Ibid, paragraph 50 – 52 and 57. 
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The Court pointed out that the cooperation should be considered well 
motivated as it strived to reach the environmental goals prescribed. The MC 
found that, inter alia due to the considerations above and even though the 
parties had a large market share, that the cooperation could not be 
considered to appreciably restrict competition.378  
 
Similarly, in Suiker Unie379 the CJEU had to determine whether Italian 
regulations, and influence exerted by the Italian authorities had affected the 
applicants’ conduct.380 After conducting a thorough analysis of the 
circumstances of the case, the CJEU stated that,  
 
All these considerations show that Italian regulations and the 
way in which they have been implemented had a determinative 
effect on some of the most important aspects of the course of 
conduct of the undertakings concerned which the Commission 
criticizes, so that it appears that, had it not been for these 
regulations and their implementation, the cooperation, which is 
the subject-matter of these proceedings, either would not have 
taken place or would have assumed a form different from that 
found to have existed by the Commission.381 
 
The Court found that the Commission had not sufficiently considered the 
effects of the regulations and consequently held that the conduct could not 
appreciably restricted competition.382  
 
In conclusion, the two cases above indicate that it is necessary, when 
analysing the context of an agreement, to determine whether there are any 
legislation that may influence the actions of the parties to an agreement. 
When such legislation exist it may be necessary to determine what effects, 
regardless of these factors, can be attributed to the actions of the parties. 
Lastly, it is necessary to determine whether or not the effects attributable to 
the parties amount to an appreciable restriction of competition.  
 
6.9 Conclusion 
As shown by the case Völk and VIVO, an agreement may escape the 
prohibition even though the nature of the agreement is inherently harmful to 
competition due to its quantitative insignificance. Similarly, as shown by the 
case of Sydsvensk Färskpotatis, an agreement where the parties have a 
significant market share may be considered qualitatively insignificant.  
                                                
378 IL Returpapper and others [1999] page 25. 
379 Joined cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 and 114-73 Coöperatieve Vereniging 
‘Suiker Unie’ UA and others v Commission of the European Communities [1975] E.C.R 
01663. 
380 See Ibid, paragraph 50 – 65. 
381 Ibid, paragraph 65. 
382 Ibid, paragraph 72. 
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Ortiz argues that where the qualitative effect tends towards zero, the 
quantitative effects are irrelevant. Conversely, when the quantitative effect 
tends towards zero, the qualitative effect becomes irrelevant. Consequently 
Ortiz states, it is necessary to establish a combined adequate level of both 
qualitative and quantitative levels of effect.383   
 
However, the reasoning only considers agreements where either the 
qualitative or quantitative factor alone may render the effects of the 
agreement insignificant. Extending the argument, having regard to that the 
assessment is part of a contextual analysis of the agreement with the 
ultimate aim to determine whether the agreement appreciably restrict 
competition, the two thresholds should be considered interdependent. 
Hence, the quantitative threshold should depend on the severity of the 
agreement’s nature, the scope and duration of the restriction and whether 
there are mitigating objectively established circumstances limiting the 
effects of the agreements, and vice versa. If a restriction in an agreement is 
qualitatively limited, e.g. when the restriction only effect one cost function 
of several or there are Regulations controlling the actions of the parties, the 
quantitative threshold could be set higher. 
 
The analysis as put forward above would only be relevant where there is 
uncertainty regarding the satisfaction o the condition that an agreement 
appreciably restricts competition. Where a restrictive object has been 
established, a deeper and more sophisticated analysis could arguably be 
necessary below the level, in the words of the MC in Bil-Bengtsson and 
others, ‘where it may put into question whether horizontal price fixing and 
market sharing appreciably restrict competition’384. Hence, the investigatory 
burden, eased by the presumption of effects in relation to object restrictions, 
would not dramatically increase.  
                                                
383 Ortiz, page 29. 
384 Bil-Bengtsson and others [2008] page 16 (unofficial translation). 
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7 Concluding Remarks and 
Analysis  
 
Section 7 is based on the research questions put forward initially in section 
1.2. The first part addresses the first question regarding the definition of the 
relevant market. Thereafter, the second and third question are analysed 
considering the interpretation and application of the condition ‘to an 
appreciable extent’ in Swedish competition law. 
 
7.1 Research Question One: Definition of 
the Relevant Market 
2 ch. 1 § SCA prohibit agreements, which have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition to an appreciable extent. A natural starting point 
when determining whether or not an agreement restrict competition to an 
appreciable extent is to define the relevant market where the undertakings, 
parties to the agreement, are competing. It is on this market the parties may 
influence the conditions of competition, or in other words, where the parties 
may exert market power. Hence, it is in relation to the defined relevant 
market that the effects should be assessed.  
 
The question of whether or not, or to what extent, there is an obligation to 
define the relevant market relates to the necessity to apply the de minimis 
principle. The assessment of the object of an agreement is in large parts 
abstract, considering the provisions and purpose of the agreement. The 
determination may often be inferred from the non-exhaustive lists of 
particularly harmful conduct in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and 101(1) TFEU or the the 
block exemption Regulations. Once a restrictive object has been established, 
it is not necessary to show any negative effects on the market. A market 
definition is therefore not necessary in this regard to find a restriction of 
competition. However, even though a restrictive object has been established 
it is necessary to prove that it is capable of having appreciable effects. 
Considering that the effects are presumed, this assessment is based on 
whether or not the undertakings are able, and the agreement capable, to 
appreciably affect the market. The ability of the parties refers to their 
position on the market and the market power they may exert, while the 
capability of the agreement to effect competition is based on the provisions 
in the agreement. In order to determine the ability of the parties to influence 
the market it is necessary to define the relevant market. This may be why 
the MC stated in Svenska Bilsportförbundet that the market is defined to 
determine the market power of the parties and that the definition is done 
primarily to determine whether the restriction of competition is appreciable.  
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In Swedish competition law there has been little discussion as to whether it 
is necessary to show that an agreement, even though it has a restrictive 
object, may result in appreciable effects. This is likely due to the fact that 
the condition is explicitly stated in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and that a literal 
interpretation of the provision provides little ambiguity in that the condition 
covers object as well as effect restrictions. Similarly, the preparatory work 
clearly states that even though the object of the agreement is to restrict 
competition, it is still necessary to determine the appreciable extent of the 
restriction. Moreover, the MC has stated in several cases that it is necessary 
to determine that the appreciability condition is satisfied when the 
agreement restricts competition by object.  
 
Consequently, it seems settled in Swedish competition law that a definition 
of the relevant market is necessary in order to satisfy the appreciability 
condition. In addition to satisfy the appreciability condition, the market 
analysis should, in light of the GC judgement in Adriatica v Commission, be 
conducted with sufficient precision to satisfy the essential requirement of 
legal certainty. The analysis should, in complex, collective and continuous 
infringements, consider that the personal liability is limited to the individual 
involvement of the undertakings. 
 
What is not as clear is how rigorous the market analysis must be conducted 
to prove that an agreement with a restrictive object infringes the prohibition 
in 2 ch. 1 § SCA. A general proposition is that the market analysis has to be 
sufficiently deep and sophisticated to allow the courts to find that the 
appreciability condition is satisfied. This follows from the placement of the 
burden of proof, which lies on the party alleging an infringement of the 
prohibition. The preparatory work and case law from the Swedish courts do 
indicate that the analysis, necessary to satisfy the condition, varies in depth 
and sophistication depending on the nature of the agreement. The 
preparatory work points out that once a restrictive object is established, a 
more summary analysis of the market may be conducted in order to satisfy 
the appreciability condition. In this connection the MC and the EU courts 
has in several cases stated that it is not necessary to provide a precise 
definition of the relevant market once it is possible with certainty to find 
that the appreciability condition is satisfied. This has generally been the case 
where the alleged market share of both parties has been sufficient to be 
found appreciable.  
 
In Bil-Bengtsson and others the MC stated that the market analysis did not 
have to precisely define the geographic scope of the market once it was 
obvious that the market shares far exceeded the threshold where the 
appreciable effects of the agreement could be put into question. The 
statement by the Court is interesting in several ways, as the language used 
by the Court resemble the language used in EU case law in relation to 
‘obvious restrictions of competition’ as well as case law concerning the 
analysis necessary to satisfy the presumption of affect on trade.  
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In EU case law the GC has further stated that the market definition is done 
to determine whether an agreement restrict competition appreciably. The 
Court held in Volkswagen that since the purpose of the market definition is, 
inter alia, to determine whether an agreement restrict competition, it is only 
necessary to define the relevant market, where it without such a definition 
would be impossible to make this determination. The statement indicate that 
there are circumstances where it would be possible to find that an agreement 
appreciably restrict competition without a definition of the market. In this 
section the GC referred to the judgement in European Night Services, 
stating that it is not necessary to take into account the actual conditions in 
which an agreement functions when it contains obvious restrictions of 
competition, such as price fixing, market sharing or control of outlets. The 
question then becomes what constitutes an obvious restriction of 
competition.  
 
It is unclear what agreements, according to EU case law, constitute an 
obvious restriction of competition, and therefore do not require that the 
actual conditions, on the market in which it functions, are taken into 
account. What can be said with certainty is that the category includes 
agreements that have generally been considered particularly harmful to 
competition, such as price fixing, market sharing and control of outlet. 
Although, I do not find it convincing that the listed agreements should be 
considered obvious in the abstract, or in other words without considering the 
market in which they function at all, based purely on their nature. Instead, I 
do find the statement by AG Trstenjak compelling that these agreements 
require only a more summary consideration of the economic and legal 
context. This also seems to resonate with the method used by the 
Commission where it broadly establishes the possible relevant markets. If it 
is possible after this analysis to find that the restriction is obvious no further 
definition of the market should be necessary. The obviousness of the 
restriction of competition should be based on the nature of the agreement 
and the circumstances of the case, making the precise definition of the 
market and an extensive market analysis superfluous. This method would 
balance the benefits of the investigatory relief that the object category 
creates, with a reasonable allocation of the burden of proof between the CA 
and SMEs. Furthermore, it would focus attention and resources on 
agreements where the parties are able to effect competition.  
 
The case CMA CGM may perhaps be viewed as an example of this method. 
In that case the GC found that it was sufficient to considered the nature of 
the agreement, the effects the restriction had on the total tariff in question 
and the strong position of the parties, without reference to the market share, 
in order to establish that an agreement appreciably restricted competition. 
The approach may, similarly to the reasoning by the DC in ALIS v 
Mediearkivet, be viewed as a gradual application of the obligation to 
investigate the circumstances of the case in relation to the alleged restriction 
of competition.  
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The obviousness of the restriction of competition should therefore be based 
on the nature of the agreement with a summary analysis of the legal and 
economic context of the circumstances in the case. However, the question 
still remains what such an analysis should consider. 
 
In Gosselin Group the GC held that even though the Commission had 
theoretically failed to show that the 5 % threshold was exceeded, it had 
based on the circumstances of the case established to the requisite legal 
standard that this was the case. The Court therefore stated that where certain 
conditions are met in regards to the market analysis, which show that the 
market share far exceeds the 5 % threshold, the Commission is not required 
to define the relevant market and calculate the market share.  
 
The conditions considered necessary to satisfy in this more summary 
analysis, was that the Commission described the sector, including supply 
and demand of the market and identified the services, products and the 
market in sufficient detail to allow the court to find that the market threshold 
was far exceeded. In the guidelines on Article 81(3) the threshold that must 
be exceeded is 5 %. While the MC in Bil-Bengtsson and others indicated 
that there is a threshold where the appreciable effect of particularly harmful 
may be put into question, it did not indicate what this threshold was. 
 
It should be clarified that the threshold in this connection is not applied to 
determine whether or not an agreement appreciably restricts competition. 
Instead, the purpose of the threshold is to provide a benchmark far above 
which a precise definition, and a deep and sophisticated market analysis, is 
not necessary. There are strong reasons based on EU case law, but also legal 
doctrine, suggesting that a 5 % threshold could be appropriate for this 
purpose. 
  
The 5 % threshold, above which effect on trade is presumed, can be traced 
back to the case Miller. The 5 % market share of the parties in that case has 
been referred to also in relation to effect on restriction. Faull & Nikpay has 
in light of, inter alia, Miller suggested that the area between 1 and 5 %, in 
relation to vertical restrictions, is a grey area in the application of the 
prohibition. Extending this reasoning to include horizontal agreements it 
would seem as it is in cases falling into this grey area that a restriction by 
object may not be considered obvious, but instead require a deeper and more 
sophisticated analysis. 
 
The recent statement by the CJEU in Expedia held that a restriction of 
competition is appreciable when 1) it has as its object the restriction of 
competition and 2) when it may affect trade. An agreement has, as noted 
above, and with reference to, inter alia, Miller v Commission, generally 
been found to affect trade where the market share of the parties has been 
around 5 % or more. Hence, the Court linked the appreciable effect of 
competition to the appreciable effect on trade in cases of restrictions by 
object.  
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The case suggest that 5 % is generally sufficient to find that an agreement 
appreciably restrict competition by object where the market share of the 
parties are around 5 % or more. Consequently, a sufficient market analysis 
proving to the requisite legal standard that the market share of the parties far 
exceed 5 % would take into account the statement in Expedia and include a 
margin of error.  
 
In conclusion, answering the first researched question, the market is defined 
in order to 1) determine whether the conditions, and in particular the 
appreciability condition, of the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA are satisfied and 
2) to satisfy the essential requirements of legal certainty. Once a restrictive 
object has been established the market analysis does not have to be as 
rigorous. When it is obvious that an agreement restricts competition it is not 
necessary to further analyse the economic and legal context. 
 
Perhaps, in relation to restrictions by object the market analysis may be 
more summary when it is possible by such an analysis to ascertain, based on 
the nature and circumstances of the case, that the market share of the parties 
far exceed 5 %. The summary analysis should provide a sufficiently detailed 
description of the sector and identify the product and services. When the 
market share of the parties are less then 5 % it may however be necessary to 
conduct a deeper and more sophisticated analysis of the market.  
 
7.2 Research Questions Two and Three: 
The Appreciability Assessment 
The definition of the relevant market is, as mentioned above, necessary to 
determine the market power of the undertakings. Moreover, the market 
power of the undertakings is fundamental in the assessment of the 
prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA, and in particular the condition that an 
agreement must restrict competition to an appreciable extent, as it indicates 
the ability of undertakings to influence the market. In this connection, the de 
minimis principle provides a minimum level of market power, below which 
undertakings escape the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and enjoy the safe 
harbour it offers. Without collective market power of some significance, on 
a correctly defined market, an agreement may not, per definition, actually or 
potentially result in anti-competitive effects. This follows from the 
definition of market power as the ability of one or several undertakings to 
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time.  
 
The distinction between agreements which have as their object or effect the 
restriction of competition is based on the inherently harmful nature of 
certain agreements. These agreements are considered harmful to the extent 
that they are considered to necessarily or inevitably restrict competition. 
However, the prohibition in 2 ch. 1 § SCA and the preparatory work to the 
Act clearly states that it is necessary to determine the appreciable effect of 
an agreement, even with a restrictive object.  
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On a fundamental level the justification for applying the de minimis 
principle is obvious. Harm on competition and ultimately consumers could 
not be a foregone conclusion, necessary or inevitable, where the parties to 
the agreement or the restrictions of the agreement are not able to influence 
the market. 
 
There are policy reasons for and against applying the de minimis principle 
on agreements with a restrictive object. As AG Kokott powerfully argued in 
Expedia, the preferential treatment of the safe harbour that the de minimis 
principle creates should not be afforded to agreements with an 
anticompetitive object. It seems to me that the reasoning is based partly on 
the inherent harmfulness of agreements which restrict competition by 
object, partly on that the conduct itself is reprehensible. The first part of this 
reasoning has been responded to above in the analysis. The second part I do 
find more compelling. The blameworthiness of an anti-competitive 
agreements should to a great extent be dependent on the intentions of the 
parties, even though it is of minor legal relevance when classifying the 
agreement.  
 
An agreement with the sole object, stripped away from all alternative pro-
competitive purposes or effects, to restrict competition to the detriment of 
consumers should reasonably be more blameworthy than an agreement 
where the restrictive object is incidental, or at least alternative, to other 
neutral or pro-competitive objectives. Considering that agreements, which 
are not able to appreciably restrict competition, lack the ability to influence 
the market, it seems unlikely that ultimately price increasing effects are 
intended by the parties to the agreement. In other words, it seems unlikely 
that undertakings would establish a price fixing cartel, which would be 
incapable of affecting the price. Instead, a narrowly defined de minimis 
principle would likely cover agreements where there are alternative reasons, 
other than harm to consumers, for cooperating. I find that this reasoning to 
some extent neutralize the argument that the application of the de minimis 
principle in when agreements restrict competition by object would be to 
invite undertakings to refrain from effective competition. 
 
In light of the low market shares, where object restrictions have been found 
not appreciably restrictive in EU case law, the undertakings likely to be 
covered by the de minimis principle are SMEs. The benefits of SMEs as 
being dynamic, flexible and of little significance, or in certain cases 
providing pro-competitive effects, for competition law were considered in 
the preparatory works of the SCA. It has been noted that there is an inherent 
difficulty in satisfying the conditions of Art. 101(3) TFEU when a 
restrictive object has been established. This is partly due to the general 
attitude that object restrictions rarely will satisfy the conditions in Art. 
101(3) TFEU, partly as it requires a rigorous analysis including empirical 
evidence to substantiate the pro-competitive effects of the agreement in 
order to balance the abstract harm as determined in the assessment of Art. 
101(1) TFEU.  
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There is no reason why the same argument would not be relevant in relation 
to the Swedish prohibition and legal exemption, since it is modelled on the 
prohibition and exemption in EU.  
 
The narrowing of the scope of the de minimis principle reallocate the burden 
of proof on SMEs to proclaim the pro-competitive virtue of the agreement 
in question. With an unreasonably limited scope of the de minimis principle 
the burden of proof would be shifted to these undertakings where there is 
genuine uncertainty regarding the possible harm of the agreement. The 
SMEs are less likely to have legal representation, due to lack of resources, 
and will therefore not have the same ability to investigate and satisfy the 
conditions of 2 ch. 1 § SCA. Consequently, I do not find the policy 
arguments stating that the de minimis should not be applied at all 
convincing. Instead, these considerations are valuable when determining the 
scope of the safe harbour it creates. CJEU has stated in recent case law that 
both object and effect restrictions must be perceptible  
 
The assessment of the appreciable effect of an agreement consists of a 
quantitative and a qualitative aspect. The quantitative threshold is based on 
the size and market share of the parties to an agreement and is therefore 
empirical and measurable. The qualitative aspect on the other hand is 
abstract and considers whether the restriction in question may appreciably 
restrict competition. While the quantitative aspect may be assessed in 
relation to a determined threshold, the qualitative aspect is highly contextual 
and depends on the circumstances of the case. Both Swedish and EU courts 
have recognized that effect and object restrictions must be appreciable. 
However, there is no clear authority establishing a quantitative threshold 
based on market shares. In EU case law the case law suggests that a market 
share below 1 % may be considered insignificant, a market share exceeding 
5 % will generally be appreciable and the area in between constitutes a grey 
zone. Within this suggested grey zone there are cases where agreements 
have been considered to appreciably restrict competition although the 
undertakings have had a market share below 5 %.  
 
An example of this is Musique Diffusion française where the parties had a 2 
– 3 % market share. Although, in the case the CJEU took into account the 
leading position of the undertakings on the fragmented market and the 
turnover in absolute numbers. Hence, the case was not solely determined 
based on the market share of the parties, but the Court considered additional 
factors to condemn the agreement. This may indicate that the Court was 
reluctant to find that the market share alone constituted an appreciable 
restriction. Similarly, the DC held in Bil-Bengtsson and others that the 
aggregate market shares of around 0.5 and 4 % could not in itself justify a 
finding that the agreement appreciably restricted competition. Even though 
the case was overturned on appeal, the later judgement was not based on the 
same market shares, as the MC defined the relevant market more narrowly, 
resulting in a larger aggregate market share of the parties to the agreement.  
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Hence, while the case does not indicate the attitude of the MC towards 
relatively small market shares in agreements with a restrictive object, it 
shows that the Swedish courts have considered the eventuality that 
agreements with an aggregate market share below 5 % may be found 
insignificant for competition. The market share threshold can not, at the 
moment, be more concretely determined then to point out that below 5 % 
the uncertainty regarding the effects of an agreement with a restrictive 
object increases. As the market shares comes closer to 0 %, the greater the 
uncertainty becomes and the need to consider additional factors increases. 
 
Admittedly, it is hard to reconcile the above reasoning with the judgement 
by the MC in VIVO. The Court put a lot of emphasize on the structure of the 
market, that there was fierce competition on the market. Furthermore, and 
more surprisingly, the Court stated that the 10 % market share, of the parties 
to the price fixing agreement, was relatively small. This statement seems to 
run contrary to the general tenor of the EU case law. Furthermore, the 
reference to the members of VIVO as being SMEs may have been a 
contributory factor for the Court finding that the market share of VIVO was 
relatively small. The relevance of categorizing undertakings as SMEs may 
also be inferred from the case Ventouris. However, since then the 
Commission de minimis notice has been amended and the reference to 
SMEs, as rarely capable of affecting competition, removed. The amendment 
is not binding on the EU or Swedish courts but may represent a change in 
attitude towards the application of the de minimis principle in relation to 
SMEs. Lastly, considering the judgement in Expedia I find it unlikely that a 
horizontal price fixing agreement would escape the prohibition where the 
aggregate market share of the parties are around 10 %. 
 
As noted above, the structure of the market may be taken into account when 
determining the quantitative aspect of the appreciability condition. This may 
include considering the level of concentration on the market, whether the 
undertakings are market leaders and whether the agreement is part of a 
bundle of agreements. These factors generally complement the analysis of 
the market share. However, in certain cases the market share may not be 
suitable to indicate the market power undertakings may exert on the relevant 
market. In these cases alternative measures should be used depending on the 
characteristics of the market. 
 
Agreements may be divided into agreements that do not restrict competition 
and agreements that do not restrict competition appreciably, because of their 
qualitative insignificance. The former category consists of 1) agreements 
where there were no actual or potential competition at the time when the 
agreement was concluded and 2) agreements where the restriction is an 
ancillary restraint necessary and proportional to achieve a desirable 
objective in terms of competition. In addition to the two categories above 
the qualitative aspect may be taken into account in two ways, in the 
assessment of the appreciable extent of a restriction. First, the nature of the 
agreement affects the assessment because it determines whether or not the 
threshold in the de minimis notice is applicable.  
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Second, it is necessary to determine whether the restriction in itself provide 
merely insignificant effects. This assessment takes into account objective 
factors, which may limit or exclude the realization of the negative effects on 
the market and whether there are legislation affecting the actions of the 
undertakings. 
 
In conclusion, the second and third research question should be answered as 
follows. The assessment determining whether or not an agreement, which 
has a restrictive object, appreciably restrict competition is based on the 
actual conditions in which it functions. While the market share of the parties 
provides a valuable indication of market power the quantitative aspect of the 
assessment also take into account the structure of the market, the 
concentration on the market, the importance of the parties and whether the 
agreement is part of a bundle of agreements. A quantitative threshold, while 
theoretically possible, may not be inferred from the case law of the Swedish 
or EU courts. Although, it is likely that the harmfulness of an object 
restriction can begin to be put in question where the aggregate market share 
of the parties is below 5 %. Consequently, there is a quantitative safe 
harbour for object restrictions, although the boundaries of its application are 
unclear.  
 
It is clear from the case law from both the Swedish and the EU courts that 
there is a qualitative safe harbour as well. The boundaries of its application 
are likely not possible to define more precisely than to provide categories of 
agreements where the courts have found the restriction of competition to be 
qualitatively insignificant. Aside from the categories considered in this 
paper to fall outside the scope of the restriction of competition condition, the 
Swedish and EU courts have considered objectively ascertainable 
limitations on a restriction rendering its effects insignificant. Furthermore, 
the courts have considered whether there has been legislation controlling the 
behaviour of the undertakings. 
 
The quantitative and qualitative safe harbours imply that when an agreement 
is quantitatively unappreciable, the qualitative nature of the agreement is 
irrelevant, and vice versa. Moreover, extending the reasoning de lege 
ferenda, the two aspects should be considered inter-dependent in such a way 
that a limited restriction, e.g. due to the fact that the restriction only affect 
one of several cost factors, would raise the quantitative threshold necessary 
to find an appreciable restriction of competition.  Ultimately, the separate 
parts of the assessment forms part of an overall assessment with the purpose 
of preventing restrictions of competition for the benefit of society and 
consumers. 
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